Over the past eight years, Israel has fought three wars in Gaza, each aimed at stopping Hamas from firing rockets into Israel, eroding its military capabilities, and ultimately deterring further attacks. In the first two, in 2009 and 2012, the IDF quickly struck at the most important accessible targets but, when that failed to compel Hamas to desist, had to switch to lower-intensity warfare and ground combat. This ultimately gave the impression that Israel chose to give up rather than get bogged down in a protracted conflict. In 2014, by contrast, the IDF pursued a strategy of gradual escalation. Moni Chorev explains the merits of such an approach:

Although [in 2014] the IDF had [a list of clearly identified military targets] for attack, the operation began with a low level of firepower, with a clear message relayed to Hamas that “quiet will be answered with quiet” and that it had the option of returning to a state of calm quickly and with little cost.

Once Hamas refused this option, attacks on targets in Gaza were stepped up. The idea of delaying the offensive climax in order to maintain an effective threat capability throughout the entire campaign requires a balanced distribution of attacks on targets over the operational timeline . . . and a continuous effort throughout the operation to identify new targets and prepare attacks on them. Steadily increasing levels of firepower intensity . . . makes clear to the enemy the cost incurred and the likely cost to be incurred further on, and causes it to appreciate the decreasing returns it can expect relative to its goals. It allows Israel to manage the operation while making optimal use of its combat resources, in line with the limited worth and importance of a localized campaign with temporary results against the backdrop of a larger, continued struggle. . . .

It is necessary to re-examine . . . the traditional aspiration to “shorten the period of combat,” that is, to attain a victory in the shortest possible time. . . . Deterrence operations are to a large extent directed at affecting the enemy mindset, and such effects take time to come to fruition. Seeking shortcuts can lead to the use of too much force at too early a stage.

Donald Trump’s recent visit to the Arabian Peninsula, where he was fawned over by Hamas’s patrons in Qatar, made deals with the Saudis but seemingly no progress on diplomatic normalization between Riyadh and Jerusalem, and met with multiple Arab leaders while neglecting Israel—has raised much concern that the president is putting distance between himself and the Jewish state and moreover, that Israel’s regional standing is sliding. These concerns strike me as exaggerated and even overwrought, and in some cases wishful thinking on the part of those who would prefer such outcomes.

To Dan Schueftan too, Jerusalem is in an excellent position both diplomatically, and—as the IDF again ramps up its operations in Gaza—military:

In the regional arena, Israel has already won the war that started on October 7, 2023. While the fighting is not over yet, a confrontation with Iran is potentially dangerous, and there is no sustainable “solution” available in Gaza, the balance of power in the Middle East shifted dramatically in favor of the Jewish state and its de-facto Arab allies.

Since October 7, Israel has devastated in Gaza the only Arab state-like entity controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. The IDF also reduced Hizballah from an intimidating strategic threat, practically in control of Lebanon, to a major nuisance, fighting a rearguard battle for its position in Beirut and in the south. And Israel’s air force exposed the supreme vulnerability of Iran’s most-defended sites.

In Cairo, Amman, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Rabat, Arab leaders could not afford to infuriate their populaces by openly celebrating the dramatic weakening of their regional deadly enemies and giving Israel the well-deserved credit for inflicting the required blows. However, they know that sustainable Israeli resilience, strategic power, determination, and tenacity in the struggle against common radical enemies are indispensable for their own regional welfare, sometimes even their existence. Whereas America is immeasurably more powerful, Israel, in their experience, is an infinitely more trustworthy and dependable partner in this ongoing struggle.