Islamic State and al-Qaeda Lurk on Israel’s Border

Despite recent gains in other parts of the country, Bashar al-Assad and his allies have almost completely lost their grip on the Syrian portion of the Golan Heights. The area is now controlled primarily by a mixed multitude of rebel groups, including the al-Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, opposed both to the regime and to Islamic State (IS). The good news is that, between these forces and Israel’s targeted strikes, Hizballah has been unable to maintain a foothold in the area. The bad news is that a branch of IS has established a stronghold in the southern Golan, abutting the Israeli side, and its power is expanding. Fabrice Balanche writes:

[The relative quiet along the Israeli border] has become increasingly fragile. IS is the most immediate threat to it, followed by Nusra Front, whose leaders could quickly shift their anti-Assad jihad toward Israel if circumstances warranted it. After all, the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda still believes that the ultimate goal of its struggle is the recovery of Jerusalem and the destruction of Israel. . . .

[In addition], attacking Israel would have extra value for IS, particularly given its recent setbacks elsewhere. History shows that hitting Israel or otherwise showing support for the Palestinian cause is a frequent recourse for Arab despots on the ropes. For example, when Saddam Hussein was under attack by the international coalition in 1991, he tried to mobilize the Arab world in his favor by launching missiles on Israel. For now, the area controlled by Islamic State’s southern branch is cut off from the rest of its territory, but linking them is not unattainable.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Al Qaeda, Golan Heights, ISIS, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security, Nusra Front, Syrian civil war

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF