Presenting a thorough account of the falling-out between Ankara and Jerusalem, and of the factors leading to the renewal of ties—officially announced at the beginning of this week—Steven A. Cook argues against exaggerating the impact of reconciliation:
[The Israeli-Turkish agreement] ends a period of estrangement for two American allies in the Middle East, which is a good thing. Beyond that kind of generality, it is hard to discern how much will change now. In the past, analysts have touted the potential for intelligence and security cooperation, but that seems unlikely. The Turks fought tooth and nail to keep the Israelis away from NATO intelligence data, blew an Israeli spy ring in Istanbul, and have engaged in various kinds of gratuitous nastiness, including disinviting the Israelis to NATO exercises held on Turkish territory and refusing flight clearance for Israeli military transport aircraft en route to Poland for visits to Auschwitz. Add to this President Erdogan’s February 2013 declaration that “Zionism is a crime against humanity.”
[In general], the Israelis are likely satisfied with the agreement, but distrust and resentment remain. On the Turkish side, this agreement came together as a result of Ankara’s weakness, which cannot sit well with the Turkish leadership. When the headlines fade and after the ambassadors are exchanged, Israel-Turkey political and diplomatic ties will likely look a lot more like they do now than current expectations suggest, and will remain vulnerable to developments in the Gaza Strip, Cyprus, and Israel’s relations with Kurds across the region.
Read more on From the Potomac to the Euphrates: http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2016/06/27/israel-and-turkey-no-big-deal/