A delegation of Saudi academics, businessmen, and other notables, led by a retired general, came to Jerusalem last week, where they met with Knesset members as well as with Dore Gold, Israel’s top diplomat. Aaron David Miller comments on the visit’s significance:

No current Saudi officials were included, but the visit could not have happened without high-level governemnt approval. This is not necessarily a harbinger of strengthening ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But it indicates how Saudi Arabia and the region are changing. . . .

[N]on-governmental meetings between Israelis and Saudis in academic and policy forums are fairly common. . . . But publicly announced meetings in Jerusalem at the King David hotel are different. The nominal purpose was discussion of the 2002 [Saudi peace] initiative. . . . It stands out that the Saudis did not call for Israel’s blanket acceptance of the 2002 initiative [as they have previously done]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken about his willingness to accept the Saudi plan—with modifications. . . .

A decade ago, sending a Saudi delegation to Israel without some significant quid pro quo or breakthrough in the peace process would have been unimaginable. . . . [But] testing the waters is one thing; to make major and unmatched concessions on a matter that still resonates broadly and deeply amid the Arab world’s divides and dysfunction would be quite another. The Saudis may be less hostile to Israel, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t require big concessions as the price of getting closer.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.