In response to Mahmoud Abbas’s intention to sue Britain over the Balfour Declaration, Moshe Arens contemplates what might have become of the Arabs of Palestine if no such document had ever been written:

We can only speculate, [but] one would expect that [the Palestinians’] fate would have been intertwined with the fate of the Arab populations in the Middle East [from] the years after World War I until the present time, and no doubt would have been affected by it. . . .

It hardly seems likely that the Palestinians, had it not been for the establishment of Israel, would have avoided being caught up in the Arab national catastrophe [that currently besets the rest of the Middle East].

Some minority groups living in Israel, [moved by] events in Syria, have begun to show an appreciation for Israel and the tranquil living conditions and economic opportunities it provides. . . . Will the time come when Palestinians, those who are citizens of Israel and even those living in Jerusalem and in Judea and Samaria, recognize that Providence has been kind to them? That the establishment of the state of Israel may have saved them the suffering of their Arab brethren in neighboring Arab countries?

The rhetoric of Palestinian leaders like Abbas in Ramallah and Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza might lead you to believe that nothing can be worse than Israeli “occupation,” but it’s not likely that all Palestinians believe that. Maybe some even consider the establishment of the state of Israel a blessing in disguise.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.