Since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Israelis have been subject to repeated waves of terror, armed groups have established bases close to Israel’s population centers, Palestinians have suffered immiseration at the hands of corrupt or fanatical tyrants, and Israeli Arabs have become increasingly radicalized. Meanwhile, Israel has received no credit from the international community for ending its occupation of Gaza and parts of the West Bank, while the PLO stands high in international opinion. Efraim Karsh comments on the opportunities Israel has forgone by adhering to so radically flawed an attempt at peacemaking:

What makes this state of affairs all the more tragic is that at the time of the Oslo Accords, the Yitzḥak Rabin government had a potentially far better peace partner in the form of the West Bank and Gaza leadership. . . .

Unlike the PLO’s diaspora constituents (the “outside,” in Palestinian parlance), who upheld the extremist dream of returning to their 1948 dwellings at the cost of Israel’s destruction, West Bankers and Gazans (the “inside”) were amenable to a peaceful coexistence that would allow them to get on with their lives and sustain the astounding economic boom that had begun under Israel’s control.

While the “outside” had no direct interaction with Israelis (or, for that matter, with any other democratic system), Israel’s prolonged rule had given the “inside” Palestinians a far more realistic and less extreme perspective. Hence their perception of Israel as more democratic than the major Western nations; hence their opposition to terror attacks and overwhelming support for the abolition of those clauses in the Palestinian Charter that called for Israel’s destruction; and hence their indifference to the thorniest issue of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, and the one central to the PLO’s persistent effort to destroy Israel through demographic subversion: namely, the “right of return.” . . .

But . . . instead of seizing [the very real possibility of] opting for the peace partner who was far better attuned to the needs and wishes of the local Palestinian populace, and against his own personal inclination to strike a deal with the “moderate insiders” rather than with the “extremist Tunis people [i.e., the PLO leadership],” Rabin was talked by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and his deputy Yossi Beilin into surrendering the West Bankers and Gazans to an unreconstructed terror organization.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.