Over the past twelve months, Israel has seen a steady stream of low-grade terror attacks—stabbings, car-rammings, and occasional shootings. Besides those successful enough to grab headlines, hundreds of others, including the recent planned attack on a wedding hall, were thwarted by Israeli security forces. Analyzing the causes of the attacks, Kobi Michael notes that they constitute more a series of small waves of terror than a single large one and suggests some ways forward:

The act of stabbing has turned into a kind of “social-cleansing” mechanism. . . . Traditional values or customs, such as family honor and blood feuds, remain effective and influential, and thus in many cases of “lone-wolf” attacks the perpetrators are family members who are avenging the death of relatives who sought to carry out an attack and were killed by the Israeli security forces or to defend the honor of their family. . . . Added to these internal factors are [external] incitement (though institutional incitement has declined in the past two months) and the copycat effect. . . .

Israel cannot address all of the fundamental causes motivating “lone-wolf” terrorism, but it can moderate some of these factors. . . . There is great importance in maintaining a low level of friction with the civilian population and continuing to refrain from collective punishment. In addition, Israel can make a very significant contribution toward improvement of the economic reality in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority’s strengthened ability to govern, which in turn can improve the restraint of violence.

Regarding the long term, . . . Israel can redefine Area C, [which, pursuant to the Oslo Accords, remains under its direct control]. . . . Instead of seeing all of it as a single bloc, it can be categorized into a number of areas possessing different statuses for different purposes. [This] would enable Israel to maintain control over the most essential areas for security and settlement needs, while allowing it to allocate land to the economic infrastructure required for developing the Palestinian economy in a way that expands the territory under full Palestinian control.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.