When Hamas began carrying out suicide bombings in the 1990s, Israeli security forces confronted what was then a relatively new tactic. The Shin Bet soon focused its attention on Yahya Ayyash, Hamas’s chief bomb maker, who had been involved in planning most of the attacks. Avi Dichter, then head of the Shin Bet’s southern division, directed the operation that culminated in Ayyash’s assassination; it involved locating the terrorist in Gaza’s refugee camps, infiltrating his inner circle, and then placing a miniature bomb into his cell phone. Reporting on a recent interview with Dichter, now a member of the Knesset, Yaakov Katz writes:

Almost 21 years later, Ayyash’s assassination continues to reverberate throughout Israel and the Gaza Strip. Not just because it was one of the first examples of how Israel was adapting to the new threat of suicide bombers, but because the skills honed then by the IDF and the Shin Bet continue to serve the country today in its never-ending war on terrorism. . . .

Dichter is of the opinion that terrorism can be defeated. When he was head of the Shin Bet, he famously said that “terrorism is like a barrel that has a bottom,” meaning that it has an end. While terrorism has dissipated in the years since, it has not completely disappeared. Nevertheless, Dichter remains confident that he was right.

But for that to happen, Israel—or any other country, for that matter—can never let up its fight. It is a constant battle that never ends. . . . A constant hunt for terrorists, he explained, forces the wanted men and women to reorganize their lives: “That is what we did during operation Defensive Shield, [which ended the second intifada in 2002]. Until then, terrorists were using 95 percent of their time to engage in terrorism and 5 percent to hide. The operation made it the opposite.” . . .

[Furthermore], according to Dichter, Israel can’t gamble with its security by withdrawing, for example, from strategic places like the Jordan Valley or the Golan Heights. “The debate about the Jordan Valley is over,” he said. “We need to understand that what happened over the last six years—an Arab earthquake that no one foresaw—means that we can’t take risks that will undermine our ability to be prepared for surprises and scenarios looming on the horizon.”

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.