The Dangers of a Unilateral Israeli Withdrawal from the West Bank

Jan. 26 2017

Last year, Israel’s Labor party added to its platform a proposal to cede 80 to 85 percent of the territory beyond the 1949 armistice lines to the Palestinian Authority’s control, absent a negotiated settlement. The plan would involve giving up certain neighborhoods of east Jerusalem, evacuating 80-100,000 Israeli residents of the West Bank, keeping the major settlement blocs, maintaining a military presence in the Jordan Valley, and completing the security barrier between Israel and a now independent Palestine. Deeming this policy one “born out of failure, not ideology [and] frustration, not vision,” Hirsh Goodman argues that it would solve nothing while creating tremendous problems:

Israel has withdrawn unilaterally twice before: from Lebanon in 2000 and from Gaza in 2005. . . . In the end, the unintended consequences of both . . . included four full-scale wars, thousands of cross-border incidents, and the transformation of tactical problems into strategic ones, all of which have left deep and indelible scars on Israel.

Here, the proposal is for a unilateral and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from 80-85 percent of the West Bank, to which Israel [has substantial legal, historical, and moral claims], to a line recognized by no party other than Israel itself. The proposal gives these vacated territories de-facto recognition as legitimately Palestinian, whereas, in reality, they are still in dispute and held by Israel in accordance with international norms and conventions pending a settlement.

It [also] unilaterally relinquishes, without any quid pro quo and contrary to broad national consensus, the unity of Jerusalem as Israel’s undivided capital.

Without an Israeli security presence, the illicit Palestinian arms industry in the West Bank will flourish and terrorism will become legitimized and encouraged. Key strategic Israeli targets, like neighborhoods in Jerusalem . . . and the entire center of Israel, including Ben-Gurion airport, could be menaced and closed down at will by a primitive rocket fired from a hill a few kilometers away or by a shoulder-fired, anti-aircraft missile. Recapturing these territories would be problematic, and the re-establishment of a reliable Palestinian Authority would be impossible. . . .

There is also the internal Israeli dimension. It does not take much to imagine the political and social consequences that a unilateral relocation—probably forced—of 100,000 Israeli citizens from their homes would cause in the country. If the Gaza evacuation was a tremor, this would be an earthquake.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

More about: Gaza expulsion, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security, Labor Party, Two-State Solution, West Bank

What’s Behind Hamas’s Threat to Stall the Release of Hostages, and How Israel Should Respond

Feb. 12 2025

Hamas declared yesterday that it won’t release more hostages “until further notice.” Given the timing and wording of the announcement—several days before the release was supposed to take place, and speaking of a delay rather than a halt—Ron Ben-Yishai concludes that it is a negotiating tactic, aimed at “creating a temporary crisis to gain leverage.” Therefore, writes Ben-Yishai, “Hamas may reverse its decision by Saturday.” He adds:

Israel cannot afford to concede to Hamas’s demands beyond what is already outlined in the agreement, as doing so would invite continuous extortion throughout the negotiation process, further delaying hostage releases.

The group sees the public outrage and growing calls for action following the release of hostages in severe medical condition as an opportunity to extract more concessions. These demands include not only a rapid start to negotiations on the next phase of the deal and an end to the war but also smaller, immediate benefits, particularly improved conditions for displaced Gazans.

Beyond these tactical objectives, Hamas has another goal—one that Israelis do not always recognize: inflicting psychological pain on the Israeli public. The group benefits from, and perhaps even draws strength from, the anguish and emotional distress in Israel, as well as the testimonies of freed hostages detailing the abuse they endured. Hamas wants these stories to be heard—not only to pressure the Israeli government but also because, in the eyes of its supporters, Israel’s suffering is its ultimate victory.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security