Benjamin Netanyahu visited Moscow earlier this month and met with Vladimir Putin to discuss the situation in Syria—his fourth such visit since 2015. By now, argue Zvi Magen and Udi Dekel, Russia has decisively tipped the scales in the Syrian civil war, successfully ensuring that the Assad regime will remain in place; what remains to be decided is whether, and how, the country will be divided once the fighting comes to an end. This question was most likely foremost on Netanyahu’s mind during his last meeting with the Russian president:

For its part, Iran still wants to see an undivided Syria under Alawite rule, and is therefore unhappy with what seems to be Russia’s policy in practice, i.e., the unofficial establishment of a type of federation in Syria that recognizes the country’s internal balance of power and grants a form of autonomy in regions having a dominant local power (e.g., the Kurdish province in the north or the Sunni enclave around Idlib). . . . At this point, Iran is cooperating with Russia, but is at the same time helping Assad expand his control of other regions; it also continues to provide arms to its key [military force in the region], Hizballah.

It is not entirely clear to what degree Russia is willing to take Iranian wishes into account, and there are points of disagreement between the two countries. Nonetheless, . . . Iran [has] provided the boots on the ground by mobilizing the main order of battle that allowed the pro-Assad coalition’s victories. Moreover, Russia has a broader range of interests tying it to Iran (energy, arms sales, trade, and more). . . .

[During Netanyahu’s most recent meeting with Putin], Israel stressed its displeasure with Iran’s dominance in Syria and the fact that Iranian forces and proxies seem destined to remain in Syria in any future arrangement. Moreover, Israel reiterated its red line: preventing the deployment of Iranian forces and the forces of its proxies in southern Syria near the Israeli border. This would seem to be the background for the March 16-17 aerial attack deep in Syria on a storage site serving Hizballah and/or forces subordinate to Iran. . . .

Russia views Israel as a regional power capable of affecting developments in the Syrian arena. It has proved [its desire to] avoid military friction with Israel . . . and is not opposed to strategic coordination with Israel about the future of Syria. . . . The big question now is to what extent Israel can . . . maintain its red lines and prevent the buildup of Hizballah and other Iranian proxies in Syria and the deployment of these forces near the border in the Golan Heights, without destabilizing its special relations with Moscow and without causing wider escalation in the northern arena.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.