Since negotiations between the Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) collapsed in 2014, various studies have emerged to account for what happened and what went wrong. Michael Herzog, a retired Israeli general who has been involved in nearly every round of negotiations since 1993, contends that the talks made progress but failed for a number of reasons, among which Israeli settlement-building was far from the most important. Those reasons include the fact that Jerusalem got nothing of substance in return for releasing hundreds of imprisoned Palestinian terrorists, the misrepresentation of Israeli positions to the Palestinians by American go-betweens, and John Kerry’s insistence on “the titanic goal of reaching agreement on all core issues” within the too-short nine-month deadline imposed on the talks. But perhaps most salient were the attitudes of Palestinian leaders:

Israel insisted—with essential U.S. support—on explicitly stating that the final outcome of negotiations must be mutual recognition between two nation-states, including recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. . . . While Palestinian objections over this issue gave the impression of bargaining, these objections intensified with time to the point of them calling it a red line and publicly announcing their refusal even to discuss the matter in future negotiations. . . .

It seems Mahmoud Abbas . . . believed that the Palestinian side had already exhausted its ability to be flexible in past years and therefore that the main onus was not on him. He was increasingly disappointed when, after the U.S. side assumed active leadership of the substantive talks through the formal channel, discrepancies . . . emerged between what each of the parties was told by and expected from the U.S. mediators. When Israel [in reaction to the Palestinians walking away from their own preliminary commitments] delayed the release of the fourth [and final] tranche of prisoners, he told those around him: “If the U.S. can’t get Israel to release them, how can they get me Jerusalem?” Abbas could now add one more item to the long list of “no’s” he delivered to President Obama, about which he apparently prides himself. . . .

[Moreover], deep into the process [Abbas] was still oscillating among three strategies at the same time: negotiating with Israel and the United States, promoting statehood through the international community, and reconciling with Hamas. In his mind, they were not mutually exclusive. But in Israeli eyes, they were totally incompatible. Switching off among them cast doubt on his seriousness. Unfortunately, the U.S. did not put its full weight behind stopping this game, with one exception that proved the rule for Israel: when threatening to dissolve the PA (a fourth strategy raised in April), the Palestinians were confronted with a strong public rebuke from the U.S. side. The next day, four senior Palestinian officials denied they ever considered it.

Much as many ask whether Netanyahu possesses the will or the capacity to make the bold decisions necessary for peace, I have serious doubts about Abbas. They are supported by his record (including the way he avoided responding to Olmert’s offer in 2008) and his demeanor. Aging, losing domestic legitimacy and focused on his legacy, he is even less prone to taking such risks.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.