With the anniversary of the Six-Day War upon us, it is easy to forget the anniversary of another event nearly as important in the history of the Jewish state. On May 14, 1977, Menachem Begin led the Likud party to its first national electoral victory, defeating Labor (then known as Mapai), which had reigned uninterrupted since 1948. Zev Chafets explains how Begin put the country on the path to becoming the economic powerhouse it is now:

Perhaps the worst accusation [his political opponents] leveled against Begin was that he was a capitalist. That was a bit ironic for a man who was born broke and stayed that way all his life. Even as prime minister, Begin bought his suits on an installment plan.

From Israel’s founding until the 1977 vote, Mapai or its affiliated Histadrut labor organization tightly controlled most of the country’s agriculture and industry, health care and social welfare, infrastructure and development, education, housing, and radio. No detail was too small for the socialists: in 1964, the government banned the Beatles on the grounds that they would subvert the morals of Israel’s pioneering youth.

Begin, who had spent an instructive year in a Siberian Soviet gulag during World War II, was skeptical of such power. He had simple instructions for his finance minister, Simḥah Ehrlich: free the economy and make life better for the common people (by which he meant Likud voters).

Ehrlich, who owned a small optics factory in Tel Aviv, was a short, sixtyish man, pink-cheeked, fastidious, and laconic nearly to the point of silence. He . . . was devoid of formal education or economic training. The Israeli media began calling him a follower of Milton Friedman, the free-market guru who had recently won the Nobel for economics. But Ehrlich, who couldn’t read or write English, didn’t know the first thing about Milton Friedman. . . .

Although Ehrlich’s reforms led to what Chafets describes as a “fiasco,” they paved the way for the more successful reforms of the mid-1980s—which saved a cratering Israeli economy—and for the even more sweeping changes of the 1990s, which allowed for the birth of today’s “start-up nation.”

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.