During the Israel-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David in 2000, Israel’s then-Prime Minister Ehud Barak came to then-President Bill Clinton with an offer for the creation of a Palestinian state, complete with many concessions on what seemed to be key points of contention. Delighted at having finally achieved a breakthrough, Clinton brought the offer to Yasir Arafat—who promptly rejected it, refusing even to make a counteroffer or to list for the horrified American president his objections to the proposal. As this scene has played out time and again over the decades, Ran Baratz suggests that attempts at peacemaking are based on faulty assumptions:

[Peace] talks always fail because the Palestinians are not interested in negotiating a permanent agreement. [Rejecting such agreements] is not a negotiation tactic that fails each time, but the exact opposite: it is a successful strategy of abstention. . . . If this theory sounds strange, it is only because we have become accustomed not only to the idea that everyone always prefers a peace treaty but also to the paradigm that is rooted in [so-called] “missed historical opportunities.”

The truth is that when there is joint will to reach an agreement, there is no need for unique “historical opportunities.” But when there is no such will, there is only an illusion of opportunities. The bitter joke that “the Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity” is completely illogical. Since the Palestinians don’t want the end that these “opportunities” present, for them these are not opportunities at all—more like historical traps. That is why they need to be avoided rather than taken advantage of. . . .

If President Trump [is interested in resuming the peace process], I would ask him to perform a simple test: before he commits to negotiations, he should ask the Palestinians for their peace plan—the Israelis’ he has long had. If he receives one, by all means, try another round of negotiations. But if the Palestinians send him—as Arafat used to say—“to drink Gaza’s seawater,” it’s a sign that nothing has changed and failure is looming on the horizon.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.