While last Thursday’s vote in the UK was a nominal victory for the Conservatives, the relative success of the Labor party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn—a hater of Israel and lover of terrorists of all stripes who has allowed his party’s anti-Semitism problem to fester—does not, on its face, appear to be good news for Israel, its supporters, or Jews in general. But Walter Russell Mead sees some good news:

Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in various combinations have been a potent force in British politics among both Tories and Labor since World War II. The non-Thatcherite right and the Corbynite left don’t have much in common, but dislike for Israel and for America’s support for it are strong at both ends of the British political spectrum.

One of the few reservoirs of strong pro-Israel feeling in the UK lies in Northern Ireland. . . . Travelers in Northern Ireland will sometimes see Palestinian flags in Catholic neighborhoods and the Star of David banner in Protestant ones.

Last [week’s] election turned those Ulster Protestants into kingmakers; the ten seats of [their] Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) hold the balance in the British parliament, and [Prime Minister] Theresa May had no choice but to look to DUP as her best coalition partner and strongest ally. It’s unlikely that a British government that depends on Northern Ireland unionists will be eager to break new ground in the world of anti-Israel boycotts. Expect gnashing of teeth at the (mostly) anti-Zionist Foreign and Commonwealth Office. . . .

As post-Brexit Britain looks for partners, it could do worse than link up with a technologically advanced country that has made significant trade and diplomatic inroads in Africa and Asia—and that favors an open global trading economy.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.