Why Peace Talks between Israel and the Palestinians Always Fail

Of the many attempts in the past seven decades to negotiate an end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, none has borne fruit. To Haviv Rettig Gur, this futility results from the inability of leaders of both sides, as well as of such third parties as the United States, to grasp the truth about their predicament:

The peace process was forged by a class of individuals possessing an exceptionally well-developed capacity for selective blindness. Some Israeli leaders—Yitzḥak Rabin, for instance—believed they could forge with Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the sort of cold but dependable standoff Israel had maintained with each Egyptian dictator since Anwar Sadat. Other Israelis—[the hard-left journalist and politician] Yossi Beilin is one example—believed they were negotiating a real reconciliation, apparently because they themselves yearned for it so intensely that they could not really fathom that it might not be reciprocated by the other side.

Both sorts of Israelis were determined to ignore the domestic Palestinian discourse advanced by Arafat and others that resisted reconciliation, elevated the ideological rejection of Israel to the level of civic religion, and openly glorified brutality against Israelis—and this was in the happy early years of Oslo peacemaking, the mid-1990s, to which more than a few of today’s despairing progressives look for inspiration.

The Palestinian side, too, was gripped by a strategic blindness that transformed peacemaking efforts into a recipe for permanent war. The PLO turned to peace talks after the first Gulf war, when American power in the region was ascendant. It was a strategic concession, not a historic turnaround. The fundamental Palestinian predicament, even today, is not in any simple sense the specific Israeli presence in the West Bank. Fatah, [the PLO’s dominant faction], was founded in 1964, not 1967, and saw its mission as addressing a deeper and older problem: . . . the problem of a nation dispossessed of its homeland whose very identity had coalesced around that loss. It is Israel itself, invasive, Jewish, a standing reproach to Arab powerlessness and decline—and, more galling, to Muslim incapacity in defending the shrines at Jerusalem’s sacred center. . . .

One can murder colonists until they return to their home country or tyrants until they abandon their unjust oppression. But how does one terrorize a nation with nowhere else to go? The Israelis are no more capable of resolving the Palestinians’ primordial predicament of displacement—for example, by fulfilling their redemption fantasy of return across the Green Line—than the Palestinians are of leaving this land quietly to the Jews.

Read more at Times of Israel

More about: Israel & Zionism, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Peace Process, PLO, Yasir Arafat, Yossi Beilin

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF