Thus argues Michael Koplow:

The political pressure that the king [of Jordan] faces to cut ties with Israel any time there are rumors that Israel is threatening al-Aqsa puts him in a bind where he is forced to take self-defeating measures, so his priority is generally to work out a solution that makes the problem go away without endangering the Israeli-Jordanian relationship. The [recent] case has been no different. . . . But [King Abdullah’s judiciousness] really shone through following the attack on the Israeli security guard in the Israeli embassy compound in Amman, and the guard’s subsequent shooting of his attacker and another Jordanian bystander.

The . . . facts in this case matter less than the optics; what ordinary Jordanians saw was that an Israeli shot and killed two Jordanians, and Israel demanded to bring him home without having to face an investigation . . . in Jordan. One might imagine how this could have quickly spiraled out of control. Instead, Israel and Jordan were able to come to an agreement that brought the embassy guard home and ended the crisis, and to the extent that the quid pro quo was trading the guard for the metal detectors—something that seems to have obviously happened but that has been denied by both sides—it allowed both sides to de-escalate things. . . .

This does not mean that King Abdullah is perfect or that Jordan bears zero responsibility. . . . Jordan could have done more in the past and should do more going forward to make sure that the Islamic Waqf [the Jordan-controlled body responsible for the Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem] does not allow weapons to be smuggled onto the Temple Mount and prevents violence.

The contrast to the behavior of the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is striking. Koplow continues:

Erdogan . . . is doing everything in his power not only to try to use the Temple Mount for his own narrow political gain, but to supplant Jordan’s role in Jerusalem entirely. . . . The Turkish government has been paying to bus protestors to the Temple Mount from around the country, and pictures have circulated on social media in the last two weeks of Muslim protestors around the site waving Turkish flags. . . .

Erdogan is not alone in pouring gasoline on the flames. Mahmoud Abbas deserves an entire column of his own detailing his irresponsibility in nearly every aspect of this drama, including his continuing dissembling over alleged threats to the Temple Mount status quo and his shockingly irresponsible and dangerous invitation to the Tanzim militia to lead mass protests [last] Friday. Any violence that occurs as a result should be laid directly at Abbas’s feet.

But Abbas is acting defensively out of cowardice and fear over what his political rivals will say; what makes Erdogan’s behavior more odious is that he is actively inflaming passions and inciting against Israel simply to make himself look better and boost his standing.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.