Since 2009, Hamas has gone to war with Israel three times. Jerusalem’s goal in each of these conflicts has been, first, deterrence—making war so costly that the terrorist organization will fear another conflict—and, second, attrition—wearing down Hamas’s popularity and hold on power. But in the likely event of another outbreak, writes Yaakov Lapin, Israel’s goal will be victory:
In [one possible] scenario, Israel would conquer Gaza and topple the Hamas regime completely. In such a scenario, Israel would either rule the Strip and its two-million Palestinian inhabitants or find someone who would.
[But] it is unlikely that the Palestinian Authority (PA) would take over Gaza after an Israeli “handoff.” Not only would the PA lose domestic legitimacy, but its ability to retain Gaza without IDF assistance would be in serious doubt. . . .
[Another, more appealing], possibility in the event of a new conflict is that the IDF takes out Hamas’s military wing but leaves in place its political wing and police force, thereby creating a feasible Israeli exit from Gaza that does not depend on Jerusalem’s finding new rulers for the Strip.
Today, three years after Operation Protective Edge, Hamas continues to rebuild itself. Its domestic arms industry is producing rockets, mortar shells, and tunnels. Tunnels under Gaza City are designed to enable Hamas battalions to launch hit-and-run attacks on the IDF and to move weapons and logistics out of Israel’s sight. The other kind of tunnel threat, the network of cross-border tunnels, is on borrowed time. Israel is building an underground wall along the 65-kilometer Gazan border, and it progresses with each passing day. Israel has invested billions of shekels in that project, and an anti-tunnel detection system is also operational. . . .
Hamas remains a serious combat challenge, and has proved its ability to adapt to Israel’s progress. But Hamas is also under intense, unremitting Israeli intelligence surveillance. Hamas is likely aware that any new clash would involve upgraded Israeli combat capabilities that are better suited for the Gazan arena.
Read more on BESA Center: https://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/victory-deterrence-israel-gaza/