When war broke out between Hizballah and Israel in the summer of 2006, the U.S. expected that the IDF would achieve a quick and decisive victory, resulting in a better situation than the status quo ante. Such an outcome would benefit the U.S. and Israel, could help Lebanon break free of Hizballah’s influence, and was even desired by many Arab governments. As the war dragged on, however, then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice lost confidence in then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and the possibility of a decisive Israeli victory receded. Elliott Abrams, who at the time served on President Bush’s National Security Council, recalls:

[A]fter two weeks of war, new realities began to surface. The IDF was not decimating Hizballah, as just about everyone had expected. The fact that combat continued meant that there was, inevitably, some damage to [Lebanese] infrastructure and collateral damage to civilian life. Hizballah did a masterful job at propaganda that falsely multiplied the scale of damage, and in this it was greatly aided by [then-Lebanese Prime Minister] Fouad Siniora and his government. . . .

The Arab governments grew nervous, because their “street” was watching Al Jazeera depict the total destruction of Lebanon. This was a lie, but a powerful one. Typically, the Europeans wrung their hands—and that was all they did or even thought about doing. . . .

So, by week three, American resolve was dissipating. There would be no great Israeli victory; we had no allies in holding out for something better than the status quo ante; Siniora was acting essentially as Hizballah’s advocate; and to Rice, Israeli policy seemed lost, to the point that she began to lose confidence in Olmert and in the IDF. . . .

[In the end], Hizballah emerged larger and better armed, the Lebanese government and armed forces became weaker in the [southern part of the country], and, though the UN International Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon was enlarged, it remained unable and unwilling to challenge Hizballah.

Why was more not achieved? Israel could not win at the United Nations, nor could the United States earn for Israel what Israel itself had not achieved on the battlefield. It had not crushed Hizballah, and having failed to achieve its military goals it could not achieve its diplomatic goals. When this became evident to Israel, Olmert suffered political damage from which he never recovered.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.