When war broke out between Hizballah and Israel in the summer of 2006, the U.S. expected that the IDF would achieve a quick and decisive victory, resulting in a better situation than the status quo ante. Such an outcome would benefit the U.S. and Israel, could help Lebanon break free of Hizballah’s influence, and was even desired by many Arab governments. As the war dragged on, however, then-Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice lost confidence in then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and the possibility of a decisive Israeli victory receded. Elliott Abrams, who at the time served on President Bush’s National Security Council, recalls:

[A]fter two weeks of war, new realities began to surface. The IDF was not decimating Hizballah, as just about everyone had expected. The fact that combat continued meant that there was, inevitably, some damage to [Lebanese] infrastructure and collateral damage to civilian life. Hizballah did a masterful job at propaganda that falsely multiplied the scale of damage, and in this it was greatly aided by [then-Lebanese Prime Minister] Fouad Siniora and his government. . . .

The Arab governments grew nervous, because their “street” was watching Al Jazeera depict the total destruction of Lebanon. This was a lie, but a powerful one. Typically, the Europeans wrung their hands—and that was all they did or even thought about doing. . . .

So, by week three, American resolve was dissipating. There would be no great Israeli victory; we had no allies in holding out for something better than the status quo ante; Siniora was acting essentially as Hizballah’s advocate; and to Rice, Israeli policy seemed lost, to the point that she began to lose confidence in Olmert and in the IDF. . . .

[In the end], Hizballah emerged larger and better armed, the Lebanese government and armed forces became weaker in the [southern part of the country], and, though the UN International Peacekeeping Force in Lebanon was enlarged, it remained unable and unwilling to challenge Hizballah.

Why was more not achieved? Israel could not win at the United Nations, nor could the United States earn for Israel what Israel itself had not achieved on the battlefield. It had not crushed Hizballah, and having failed to achieve its military goals it could not achieve its diplomatic goals. When this became evident to Israel, Olmert suffered political damage from which he never recovered.

Earlier this month, an operative working for, or in conjunction with, Hizballah snuck across the Israel-Lebanese border and planted a sophisticated explosive near the town of Megiddo, which killed a civilian when detonated. On Thursday, another Iranian proxy group launched a drone at a U.S. military base in Syria, killing a contractor and wounding five American soldiers. The former attack appears to be an attempt to change what Israeli officials and analysts call the “rules of the game”: the mutually understood redlines that keep the Jewish state and Hizballah from going to war. Nadav Pollak explains how he believes Jerusalem should respond:

Israel cannot stop at pointing fingers and issuing harsh statements. The Megiddo attack might have caused much more damage given the additional explosives and other weapons the terrorist was carrying; even the lone device detonated at Megiddo could have easily been used to destroy a larger target such as a bus. Moreover, Hizballah’s apparent effort to test (or shift) Jerusalem’s redlines on a dangerous frontier needs to be answered. If [the terrorist group’s leader Hassan] Nasrallah has misjudged Israel, then it is incumbent on Jerusalem to make this clear.

Unfortunately, the days of keeping the north quiet at any cost have passed, especially if Hizballah no longer believes Israel is willing to respond forcefully. The last time the organization perceived Israel to be weak was in 2006, and its resultant cross-border operations (e.g., kidnapping Israeli soldiers) led to a war that proved to be devastating, mostly to Lebanon. If Hizballah tries to challenge Israel again, Israel should be ready to take strong action such as targeting the group’s commanders and headquarters in Lebanon—even if this runs the risk of intense fire exchanges or war.

Relevant preparations for this option should include increased monitoring of Hizballah officials—overtly and covertly—and perhaps even the transfer of some military units to the north. Hizballah needs to know that Israel is no longer shying away from conflict, since this may be the only way of forcing the group to return to the old, accepted rules of the game and step down from the precipice of a war that it does not appear to want.