In an Attempt at Compassion, the Israeli Supreme Court Has Thrown Immigration Policy into Chaos

Just as the immigration debate has returned to the fore in the U.S., Israel, too, has been struggling over how to deal with its own illegal aliens. The problem peaked around 2011, when over 2,000 individuals were entering the country illegally every month, most of whom settled in lower-class neighborhoods of South Tel Aviv. In a recent decision, the High Court of Justice has blocked the government from forcibly deporting those illegal immigrants who refuse to leave voluntarily—a decision Yoaz Hendel finds troubling:

The Israeli government has formulated an immigration policy similar to [that of] other countries: an open detention facility [for those who enter the country without permission] and [then deportation] to a third country. The decision was reasonable and proper compared with what’s going on in the rest of the world, especially considering Israel’s size and its needs. . . .

[T]he High Court of Justice made a double error. The first was to . . . intervene in the government’s decision, and on one of the only issues on which it was able to put together a clear and orderly policy allowing for a serious and proportional mechanism. The second error was showing leniency instead of discussing policy. . . .

The end result is the same: as of now, Israel has no sanctions with which to operate against illegal aliens who refuse deportation. Israel [thus] has no immigration policy [whatsoever]. . . .

We are responsible to see to the care of those who are already here, but the residents of South Tel Aviv who are Israeli citizens should come before the illegal aliens, who are not. Both groups deserve personal compassion, but also a clear-cut policy. The High Court of Justice ruled out the latter option, leaving in place only leniency. . . . And that is a mistake.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Immigration, Israel & Zionism, Israeli politics, Supreme Court of Israel, Tel Aviv

To Save Gaza, the U.S. Needs a Strategy to Restrain Iran

Since the outbreak of war on October 7, America has given Israel much support, and also much advice. Seth Cropsey argues that some of that advice hasn’t been especially good:

American demands for “restraint” and a “lighter footprint” provide significant elements of Hamas’s command structure, including Yahya Sinwar, the architect of 10/7, a far greater chance of surviving and preserving the organization’s capabilities. Its threat will persist to some extent in any case, since it has significant assets in Lebanon and is poised to enter into a full-fledged partnership with Hizballah that would give it access to Lebanon’s Palestinian refugee camps for recruitment and to Iranian-supported ratlines into Jordan and Syria.

Turning to the aftermath of the war, Cropsey observes that it will take a different kind of involvement for the U.S. to get the outcomes it desires, namely an alternative to Israeli and to Hamas rule in Gaza that comes with buy-in from its Arab allies:

The only way that Gaza can be governed in a sustainable and stable manner is through the participation of Arab states, and in particular the Gulf Arabs, and the only power that can deliver their participation is the United States. A grand bargain is impossible unless the U.S. exerts enough leverage to induce one.

Militarily speaking, the U.S. has shown no desire seriously to curb Iranian power. It has persistently signaled a desire to avoid escalation. . . . The Gulf Arabs understand this. They have no desire to engage in serious strategic dialogue with Washington and Jerusalem over Iran strategy, since Washington does not have an Iran strategy.

Gaza’s fate is a small part of a much broader strategic struggle. Unless this is recognized, any diplomatic master plan will degenerate into a diplomatic parlor game.

Read more at National Review

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy