Today Benjamin Netanyahu concludes his stay in Argentina and flies to Colombia as part of the first-ever official visit by an Israeli prime minister to Latin America. Emmanuel Navon recounts the many ups and downs of the Jewish state’s relations with the region, and explains why improving these relations is important:

While most Latin American countries voted in favor of partition at the UN in 1947, their voting patterns at the General Assembly became unfavorable to Israel from the 1960s onward. In 1964, a voting bloc of Third World countries (known as the “Group of 77”) was formed at the General Assembly. Latin American countries were part of this bloc, which was very much influenced by its Arab and Muslim members. . . . [However], Latin America became the last bastion of Israel’s presence in the Third World after 1973: Israel was isolated from Africa, and it had no diplomatic relations with China and India. . . .

Except for Nicaragua after the 1979 Sandinista Revolution, all Central American countries, as well as Argentina, bought weapons from Israel. This was a win-win relationship since Latin America needed Israel’s weapons as much as Israel needed Latin America’s oil (especially after the 1979 Iranian revolution). Communist guerrillas [trying to overthrow these regimes] also happened to have close ties with the PLO and with anti-Western Arab leaders. The Sandinistas [who eventually seized power] in Nicaragua, for example, had been cooperating with the PLO since 1969, and they enjoyed the military and financial support of the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.

In recent years, relations between Israel and Latin America have been overshadowed by the influence of Iran and Hizballah. On July 18, 1994, the Jewish community center of Buenos Aires was bombed, killing 85 people. It was revealed in October 2006 that Iran had ordered the bombing and that Hizballah had carried it out. . . . Hizballah’s presence in Latin America has since then been growing through the expansion of Iran’s diplomatic and intelligence missions, businesses, and investments. . . .

Argentina’s previous president, Cristina Kirchner, had developed strong ties with Iran. Her successor and political opponent, Mauricio Macri (elected in December 2015), has rectified Argentina’s foreign policy. He is well-disposed toward the West and toward Israel, and Netanyahu is right to build a personal relationship with him as well as with other like-minded Latin American leaders. The prime minister’s trip to Latin America is timely, and his diplomatic initiative praiseworthy.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.