Last year, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a database of corporations that do business “directly or indirectly” with Israeli settlements. High Commissioner of Human Rights Prince Zeid Raad al-Hussein of Jordan recently demanded of some businesses that they supply information “confirming, clarifying, or contesting” their place in the database and threatening to release it publicly at the end of the year. So far, only one of the companies has been willing to make Zeid’s communication public, although some have leaked information to the press. Anne Bayefsky writes:

Recipients [of Zeid’s letters] reportedly include Coca-Cola, Caterpillar, Priceline.com, TripAdvisor, and Airbnb, as well as Israeli businesses such as the pharmaceutical leader Teva, the country’s two largest banks (Hapoalim and Leumi), the bus company Egged, the national water company Mekorot, and other major Israeli businesses. . . . [These] companies face public censure—driven by the UN’s vast global network—unless they comply with the demands of Zeid and the Human Rights Council. . . .

The fact is that UN Human Rights Council resolutions have the legal status of toilet paper. But that isn’t stopping the high commissioner from huffing, puffing, and bluffing. And alarmingly, until now, nearly all the recipients of these letters appear to have been playing by the blackmailer’s rules [by not commenting publicly]. . . . Shareholders, employees, and communities that depend on the well-being of the blackmailed companies—along with the elected representatives responsible for serving these constituents—have been kept in the dark. . . .

[O]n the off-chance that the UN letterhead makes American CEOs nervous, they need to be reminded that they owe their allegiance to American law and public policy. It is [high time] for Congress and President Trump to step up and answer this UN assault on American businesses and our ally Israel.

Three simple, morally unambiguous steps will do it: the expeditious adoption of the Israel Anti-Boycott Act [currently before Congress], the immediate resignation of the United States from the . . . UNHRC, [and] refusal to send Prince Zeid another penny.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.