Despite the growing influence of Hamas, and despite living in neighborhoods that tend to get an unequal share of municipal resources, the Arabs of eastern Jerusalem express surprisingly encouraging attitudes toward Israel. According to recent surveys, 42 percent report feeling a sense of belonging in Israeli society, 43 percent recognize a historic connection between the Jewish people and the land, and 46 percent have a positive attitude toward the police. Nadav Shragai explains what Jerusalem can and should do to capitalize on this good will:

Many [of east Jerusalem’s Arabs] are undergoing a process of “Israelization,” not to say Westernization, and are becoming more and more like [Arab citizens of Israel living elsewhere in the country]. Some, dissatisfied with their permanent-residency status, are requesting Israeli citizenship, but this is granted sparingly.

Despite this, however, merely a few thousand of the 335,000 east-Jerusalem Arabs have voted in municipal elections for Jerusalem’s city council, even though they have the right to [do so]. Incidentally, far more east-Jerusalem residents would vote, and perhaps shape a list that . . . represents them in the municipality, had they not been terrorized by Fatah and Hamas. . . .

But this time things can be different. . . . As Jews and Israelis, we shouldn’t be afraid of this change. If voters and political lists from east-Jerusalem were to participate actively in local elections, it would be a welcome thing. Jerusalem is a binational city, and that is not going to change anytime soon. . . .

Israel needs to create the conditions for them to participate in truly free elections. They will not come to the ballots if they fear being shot on the way, or having their cars torched. The police and the Shin Bet security agency, for their part, must enable the Arabs to vote without fear. Technology can also be used to this end: in the 21st century, it is possible to vote using a computer, even from home or from the workplace. Even those who fear east-Jerusalem Arabs influencing national Jewish interests in Jerusalem should not be afraid of striking a true partnership with them.

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.