On November 8, Amman, Washington, and Moscow concluded an agreement to expand the “de-escalation zones” in southern Syria that had been created in a July 7 deal among the three parties. A key provision designates an “exclusionary zone” from which foreign forces—in this case those of Iran and Hizballah—must withdraw. But, even if Iran and Russia abide by their part of the bargain, these terms “will ultimately preserve rather than roll back Iran’s long-term position,” write Genevieve Casagrande, Patrick Hamon, and Bryan Amoroso. The experience of the July agreement shows how:

The [newly created] buffer zone at its maximum extent places foreign forces up to 30km away from the Syrian-Jordanian border and Golan Heights. . . . [But] Iran has set conditions to preserve its safe haven in southern Syria. Iran and Lebanese Hizballah initially withdrew many of their foreign forces from areas along the Syrian-Jordanian border after the [first] “de-escalation zone” went into effect in July. However, Iran left behind friendly local paramilitary groups and a small number of foreign fighters to continue to cultivate and recruit local groups not covered by the exclusion zone but ultimately subordinate to Iran. Iran is also continuing its build-up on the outskirts of this zone, which places its forces less than an hour drive from the Golan Heights. . . .

The deal likewise will not prevent Iran from developing permanent military basing in Syria, another Israeli redline. . . .

Al-Qaeda, [meanwhile], has exploited the de-escalation zone to develop a new durable safe haven along the Syrian-Jordanian border. Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham will capitalize on the diminishing external support for vetted anti-Assad-regime opposition groups to expand its footprint in southern Syria. The Trump administration issued orders that will reportedly end all covert support to opposition groups in Syria by December 2017. The cutoff will lead to the cancellation of salaries for thousands of rebel fighters even as opposition groups and affiliated governance structures are already struggling to maintain basic security and infrastructure—such as prisons and courthouses—across southern Syria. . . .

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.