It is often claimed that Israeli communities east of the 1949 armistice lines (the so-called “Green Line”) are on the verge of rendering impossible the creation of a Palestinian state on the West Bank. If, the argument goes, the demographic growth of settlements and the building of new houses continue unchecked, Jewish and Arab populations will become hopelessly entangled. But a careful look at the details show that this is false, as David Makovsky explains:

If we want to parse out territorial solutions, we need to distinguish between two groups of settlers . . . : one group lives west of (i.e., within) the Israeli security barrier, constructed by the Israeli government during the second intifada to stymie the flow of Palestinian suicide bombers from the West Bank. The second group lives beyond or east of the security barrier. According to the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, approximately 85 percent of Israelis living east of the Green Line but within the security barrier’s delineated area live in approximately 8 percent of the West Bank, in areas largely adjacent to [cities west of the Green Line]. This translates to just under 556,000 Israelis living inside, or west, of the security barrier and more than 97,000 living outside of the barrier. . . .

Two settlements out of a total of 139 currently account for almost 30 percent of all West Bank settlers and 46 percent of the [population] growth over the last year. These are both ultra-Orthodox settlements, denoting a shift since the settlement movement was launched in the late 1960s, largely by religious Zionists. . . . In contrast, the ultra-Orthodox are largely motivated by socioeconomic concerns, especially affordable housing, [rather than ideology].

In other words, Makovsky argues, demographic growth in the settlements is not driven by nationalist zealots, as the Western media frequently claims; and most of the settlements can be annexed to Israel through land-swaps without threatening Palestinian territorial integrity.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.