A recent piece by an opinion writer for the New York Times argued that “liberal Zionism”—which the author seems to equate with support for a two-state solution—is dead, and that the U.S. decision to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem is “another nail in [its] coffin.” Although this argument has rapidly been gaining ground, writes Emily Shire, it is entirely without merit:

[L]liberal Zionism and its preferred two-state solution have persisted in the face of a growing chorus of critics insisting a one-state solution is now inevitable. . . . Despite [the Times writer’s] and others’ accounts, reports of the death of liberal Zionism are greatly exaggerated.

But even though it lacks substantive support, the “liberal Zionism is dead” refrain is dangerous because it makes it easier to convince liberals that they should dispense with Zionism altogether—liberal or otherwise. Zionism is the basic support for Jewish sovereignty; it entails no specifications about two-state solutions, settlements or, for that matter, opinions of Benjamin Netanyahu. Yet when critics argue that Trump’s [announcement about moving the American embassy to Jerusalem] sounds the death knell for liberal Zionism, they are implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) making support for Israel a partisan issue.

[This line of reasoning] boosts the myth that liberalism and Zionism are mutually exclusive. . . . Moreover, it all but ensures that antipathy toward any form of Zionism will grow because it makes it easier to discount—or plainly demonize—the concept of Jewish sovereignty. The “liberal Zionism is dead” narrative insidiously lays the groundwork for people across the political spectrum to accept a world where Israel is dispensable.

In an interview on Sunday, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan stated that the Biden administration remains committed to nuclear negotiations with the Islamic Republic, even as it pursues its brutal crackdown on the protests that have swept the country. Robert Satloff argues not only that it is foolish to pursue the renewal of the 2015 nuclear deal, but also that the White House’s current approach is failing on its own terms:

[The] nuclear threat is much worse today than it was when President Biden took office. Oddly, Washington hasn’t really done much about it. On the diplomatic front, the administration has sweetened its offer to entice Iran into a new nuclear deal. While it quite rightly held firm on Iran’s demand to remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from an official list of “foreign terrorist organizations,” Washington has given ground on many other items.

On the nuclear side of the agreement, the United States has purportedly agreed to allow Iran to keep, in storage, thousands of advanced centrifuges it has made contrary to the terms of the original deal. . . . And on economic matters, the new deal purportedly gives Iran immediate access to a certain amount of blocked assets, before it even exports most of its massive stockpile of enriched uranium for safekeeping in a third country. . . . Even with these added incentives, Iran is still holding out on an agreement. Indeed, according to the most recent reports, Tehran has actually hardened its position.

Regardless of the exact reason why, the menacing reality is that Iran’s nuclear program is galloping ahead—and the United States is doing very little about it. . . . The result has been a stunning passivity in U.S. policy toward the Iran nuclear issue.