In 2016, a conference was scheduled to take place in South Africa regarding the looming water shortage in the southern part of the country, but agitation from the boycott, divest, and sanction movement (BDS) over the participation of the Israeli ambassador led to the conference’s cancellation. Since then the South African government has been reluctant to receive advice or aid from the Jewish state, which has shared its expertise in desalination and water conservation with numerous other countries. Now, writes Howard Feldman, residents of Cape Town expect that water in their city will be shut off in May:

Cape Town is set to be the first major [modern] city to run out of water. The city is experiencing the worst drought in its history. Residents are being asked to utilize less than 50 liters (thirteen gallons) per day, but it is unlikely that they will avoid “Day Zero,” the day the taps run dry. It is unimaginable what contingencies can be put in place to deal with the series of events that will follow that day. . . .

[In 2016], Radio Islam in South Africa celebrated the announcement [of the conference’s cancellation] by interviewing one Professor Patrick Bond, [who claimed that] what Israel has achieved [in terms of drought prevention] can be done by any child and all that Israel has done is practice “water apartheid” and steal Palestinian water. . . . He of course made no mention of desalination or the fact that Israeli cities recycle around 85 percent of their water. Nor did he mention any other achievement in Israel that has changed the ecology of the country for the better.

The fact that South Africa is experiencing one of the worst droughts in living memory, and that the situation is critical, is not a concern for those who hate Israel.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”