The Knesset recently considered a bill that would declare the Jewish state’s sovereignty over the West Bank. While the idea is gaining traction on the Israeli right, Efraim Inbar argues that it is a bad one, and a distraction from more pressing matters:

The Jewish state’s enforcement agencies have difficulty trying to enforce the country’s decisions within Israel’s sovereign territory. Only some of the government’s decisions are actually carried out. Tens of thousands of demolition orders of illegally built homes [by Palestinians] remain written on paper without being implemented. There are even some areas in the country where police officers hesitate to exercise their authority. In other words, Israel suffers from a governance problem that stems from the political system’s lack of resolve. The politicians try to avoid confrontations that carry political repercussions, and there are not enough policemen or inspectors for effective law enforcement. This phenomenon is the result not of a lack of sovereignty but of governance shortcomings.

Therefore, without effective governance, there is no point in deciding to expand the domain of Israeli sovereignty. Even today, the Israeli government has the necessary legal authority to prevent illegal home construction in Area C, [the part of the West Bank that, pursuant to the Oslo Accords, is under direct Israeli control]. . . . Yet Israel refrains from demolishing many illegal buildings in Area C. . . .

Declaring sovereignty over Judea and Samaria also exceeds the limits of the Israeli consensus. Applying Israeli law in Judea and Samaria does not command the support of the majority of Israelis, . . . [unlike] the consensus on applying Israeli law to the Old City in Jerusalem and to the Golan Heights.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.