In recent years, the governments of Greece and Cyprus have not only grown closer with each other but have also jointly cultivated better relations with Israel, Italy, Egypt, and Jordan. Eran Lerman sees the potential for the formation of a six-way alliance among these countries, or at least several interlocking three-member alliances, based on strategic and economic cooperation, including the joint exploitation of national-gas reserves. He writes:

The circumstances under which this format of strategic cooperation is developing in the eastern Mediterranean are directly related to a combination of three factors that have re-shaped the regional balance of power. . . . Of critical importance was the rise to power in 2002 of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the gradual but significant changes that have occurred in Turkey’s [ideological] and strategic orientation. Although Turkey has always been perceived as an enemy in Athens and Nicosia, the threat is now being felt even more in view of the justified concern that Turkey is seeking regional hegemony under the banner of an ideology with a distinctly Islamist character. Erdogan’s policies . . . are turning out to be a major challenge to the stability of the regimes in Egypt and Jordan, as well as to the essential interests of Israel, whether these have to do with Gaza or with Jerusalem. He is also participating in the struggle for power in Syria. . . .

The upheaval being experienced in the Arab world . . . is also having an important and [durable] effect. . . . Added to this is the effect of the Iranian and Russian presence in Syria, along the shores of the Mediterranean, and of their ambitions for further consolidation there. All this is part of an evolving reality in which the U.S. is reducing its strategic presence in the region and in which China, Russia, and to no less an extent Iran are each seeking in their own way to benefit from the situation and to solidify their positions. Israel, for its own reasons, is expanding its diplomatic efforts at the highest levels. . . .

The goal [of the alliance] should not be defined in terms of “containment” (with respect to the regime in Ankara) but rather as the opening up of possibilities. Thus, Turkey would be invited to join, although it is reasonable to assume that it will choose to do so only after it has adopted a different political and ideological trajectory. . . .

Israel has a growing interest in stressing that it is part of the Mediterranean community, in nurturing the reciprocal relations among the [area’s other] nations, and in encouraging a joint Mediterranean identity as opposed to Arabism and radical Islam. The new structure can, to a certain extent, also assist in countering Russia’s growing influence. . . .

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.