In recent years, the governments of Greece and Cyprus have not only grown closer with each other but have also jointly cultivated better relations with Israel, Italy, Egypt, and Jordan. Eran Lerman sees the potential for the formation of a six-way alliance among these countries, or at least several interlocking three-member alliances, based on strategic and economic cooperation, including the joint exploitation of national-gas reserves. He writes:

The circumstances under which this format of strategic cooperation is developing in the eastern Mediterranean are directly related to a combination of three factors that have re-shaped the regional balance of power. . . . Of critical importance was the rise to power in 2002 of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the gradual but significant changes that have occurred in Turkey’s [ideological] and strategic orientation. Although Turkey has always been perceived as an enemy in Athens and Nicosia, the threat is now being felt even more in view of the justified concern that Turkey is seeking regional hegemony under the banner of an ideology with a distinctly Islamist character. Erdogan’s policies . . . are turning out to be a major challenge to the stability of the regimes in Egypt and Jordan, as well as to the essential interests of Israel, whether these have to do with Gaza or with Jerusalem. He is also participating in the struggle for power in Syria. . . .

The upheaval being experienced in the Arab world . . . is also having an important and [durable] effect. . . . Added to this is the effect of the Iranian and Russian presence in Syria, along the shores of the Mediterranean, and of their ambitions for further consolidation there. All this is part of an evolving reality in which the U.S. is reducing its strategic presence in the region and in which China, Russia, and to no less an extent Iran are each seeking in their own way to benefit from the situation and to solidify their positions. Israel, for its own reasons, is expanding its diplomatic efforts at the highest levels. . . .

The goal [of the alliance] should not be defined in terms of “containment” (with respect to the regime in Ankara) but rather as the opening up of possibilities. Thus, Turkey would be invited to join, although it is reasonable to assume that it will choose to do so only after it has adopted a different political and ideological trajectory. . . .

Israel has a growing interest in stressing that it is part of the Mediterranean community, in nurturing the reciprocal relations among the [area’s other] nations, and in encouraging a joint Mediterranean identity as opposed to Arabism and radical Islam. The new structure can, to a certain extent, also assist in countering Russia’s growing influence. . . .

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”