While Hamas’s long-term goal remains, as always, the destruction of Israel, Ghaith al-Omari and Grant Rumley argue that the organization’s ongoing conflict with Mahmoud Abbas is the factor most likely to lead to an escalation in violence in Gaza. Thus, Hamas’s massive border protest on Friday was not about Israel’s restrictions on imports into the Gaza Strip, or Egypt’s sealing of its border with the territory, and certainly not about Gazans’ putative desire to return to the homes abandoned by their ancestors, but about breaking the stalemate with the Palestinian Authority brought about by Hamas’s refusal to pay its electricity bills. Nor is Hamas the only party to blame:

Abbas [himself] seems keen on instigating a broader clash. The Palestinian Authority leader made headlines last month for calling the U.S. ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, a “settler son of a dog” in a speech admonishing the Trump administration’s policies. . . . Yet in the same speech Abbas also directed the bulk of his ire toward Hamas, the group that overthrew his Palestinian Authority in Gaza over a decade ago. . . .

[While] blaming Hamas for an explosion [in Gaza] last month that targeted his prime minister and intelligence chief, Abbas is publicly mulling whether to [impose] further sanctions on an already impoverished Gaza Strip. Indeed, amid increasing concern over his deteriorating health, it appears the eighty-three-year-old leader is looking to strike a confrontational tone in the final act of his presidency, no matter the costs.

It’s these costs that are starting to concern Israeli security officials. The defense minister, Avigdor Liberman, recently accused Abbas of attempting to incite another Hamas-Israel war by cutting off funds to Gaza. American officials have echoed these concerns at a recent White House meeting over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. These fears are well founded. In recent weeks, several Israeli soldiers have been wounded as militant factions in the Strip placed improvised explosive devices along border fences. This, coupled with Hamas’s ongoing mass protests in Gaza, as well as any additional economic sanctions Abbas may impose on Gaza, have many worried that Liberman’s accusation is accurate. . . .

Abbas’s recent combative tone and actions suggest he cares more about his legacy and less about the repercussions of his policies. In Gaza, a cornered Hamas appears to be replicating the playbook that led to previous wars with Israel. Neither side seems particularly interested in de-escalation.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.