While Hamas’s long-term goal remains, as always, the destruction of Israel, Ghaith al-Omari and Grant Rumley argue that the organization’s ongoing conflict with Mahmoud Abbas is the factor most likely to lead to an escalation in violence in Gaza. Thus, Hamas’s massive border protest on Friday was not about Israel’s restrictions on imports into the Gaza Strip, or Egypt’s sealing of its border with the territory, and certainly not about Gazans’ putative desire to return to the homes abandoned by their ancestors, but about breaking the stalemate with the Palestinian Authority brought about by Hamas’s refusal to pay its electricity bills. Nor is Hamas the only party to blame:

Abbas [himself] seems keen on instigating a broader clash. The Palestinian Authority leader made headlines last month for calling the U.S. ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, a “settler son of a dog” in a speech admonishing the Trump administration’s policies. . . . Yet in the same speech Abbas also directed the bulk of his ire toward Hamas, the group that overthrew his Palestinian Authority in Gaza over a decade ago. . . .

[While] blaming Hamas for an explosion [in Gaza] last month that targeted his prime minister and intelligence chief, Abbas is publicly mulling whether to [impose] further sanctions on an already impoverished Gaza Strip. Indeed, amid increasing concern over his deteriorating health, it appears the eighty-three-year-old leader is looking to strike a confrontational tone in the final act of his presidency, no matter the costs.

It’s these costs that are starting to concern Israeli security officials. The defense minister, Avigdor Liberman, recently accused Abbas of attempting to incite another Hamas-Israel war by cutting off funds to Gaza. American officials have echoed these concerns at a recent White House meeting over the humanitarian situation in Gaza. These fears are well founded. In recent weeks, several Israeli soldiers have been wounded as militant factions in the Strip placed improvised explosive devices along border fences. This, coupled with Hamas’s ongoing mass protests in Gaza, as well as any additional economic sanctions Abbas may impose on Gaza, have many worried that Liberman’s accusation is accurate. . . .

Abbas’s recent combative tone and actions suggest he cares more about his legacy and less about the repercussions of his policies. In Gaza, a cornered Hamas appears to be replicating the playbook that led to previous wars with Israel. Neither side seems particularly interested in de-escalation.

Two weeks ago, a terrorist—most likely working for Hizballah—managed to cross into Israel from Lebanon and plant an explosive device near Megiddo that wounded a civilian. The attack, according to Matthew Levitt, is a sign of the Iran-backed militia’s increasing willingness to challenge the tacit understanding it has had with the IDF for over a decade. Such renewed aggression can also be found in the rhetoric of the group’s leaders:

In the lead-up to the 2006 war, [Hizballah’s] Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah famously miscalculated how Israel would respond to the cross-border abduction of its soldiers. According to Israeli analysts, however, he now believes he can predict the enemy’s behavior more accurately, leading him to sharpen his rhetoric and approve a series of increasingly aggressive actions over the past three years.

Nasrallah’s willingness to risk conflict with Israel was partly driven by domestic economic and political pressures. . . . Yet he also seemed to believe that Israel was unlikely to respond in a serious way to his threats given Hizballah’s enlarged precision-missile arsenal and air-defense systems.

In addition to the bombing, this month has seen increased reports of cross-border harassment against Israelis, such as aiming laser beams at drivers and homes, setting off loud explosions on the Lebanese frontier, and pouring sewage toward Israeli towns. Hizballah has also disrupted Israeli efforts to reinforce the security barrier in several spots along the Blue Line, [which serves as the de-facto border between Lebanon and the Jewish state].

This creeping aggressiveness—coupled with Nasrallah’s sense of having deterred Israel and weakened its military posture—indicate that Hizballah will continue trying to move the goalposts.