When, in 1994, the Oslo Accords first went into effect, fighters from the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s military wing took over police and security duties in Jericho and Gaza; later they would assume control throughout the West Bank. Yasir Arafat, as Neri Zilber and Ghaith al-Omari explain, quickly turned his new security services into personal armies that would maintain his grip on power and, eventually, make war on Israel:

Agreements signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization [allowed for] the creation of an armed internal-security force in order to ensure law and order. Yet what was created in practice through Arafat’s personalized, ad-hoc style diverged sharply from the letter of the agreements. Various competing security services proliferated, rejectionist terrorist groups like Hamas were never brought to heel, and, writ large, Arafat never established a monopoly on the means of violence. Most damaging for the peace process, close Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation was on several occasions undermined by armed clashes between the Palestinian Authority Security Forces [PASF] and the IDF. . . .

Arafat never truly relinquished the military option vis-à-vis Israel. The PASF, along with other Fatah elements, was directly implicated in the ensuing terrorism campaign; Israel responded directly, reoccupying the West Bank and bringing about the PASF’s effective collapse. In the wake of the second intifada, which ended around 2005, reform efforts focused on the security sector, yet they could not forestall the subsequent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. . . .

But since the suppression of the second intifada, Arafat’s death, and the Hamas takeover of Gaza, the PASF have been reformed, thanks in no small part to U.S. involvement, and, whatever their faults, have worked with their Israeli counterparts to curb terrorist activities. Indeed, they are a paragon of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation. Omari and Zilber conclude their history of the forces with some recommendations for the future:

U.S. officials must urge both parties not to allow political considerations to affect the security realm adversely. This guidance applies in two areas. The first involves keeping any proposed security initiatives—oftentimes coordinated [with U.S. representatives]—secret and negotiated at the professional/technical echelons. (Previous efforts are known to have been undermined by Israeli leaks to the media by partisan political players.) This requires senior U.S. officials to make clear to their Palestinian and Israeli counterparts that keeping such initiatives depoliticized is an American priority.

[They must also make] clear to both parties that security—in particular, the mutually beneficial coordination—must not be used as a tool during political crises, as the PA did in partially suspending coordination after the July 2017 al-Aqsa crisis erupted. U.S. officials would do well to heed this advice in terms of their own policy choices: developments on the high diplomacy track, including the quixotic goal of restarting Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, cannot be allowed to trickle down and thus to have adverse effects on stability on the ground.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.