Truth and Lies about Entebbe

April 4 2018

The new film 7 Days in Entebbe is based primarily on a book by the historian Saul David about the daring Israeli raid to rescue hostages held at a Ugandan airport in 1976. In a recent interview, David has suggested that the operation—which resulted in the deaths of the terrorists and many of their helpers, three of the 106 hostages, and the raid’s commander Yoni Netanyahu—was something other than a stunning success. Richard Kemp, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, comments:

In trying to second-guess [Yoni] Netanyahu’s actions at Entebbe, David shows that even the most assiduous academic cannot necessarily perceive the reality of close military combat. He says: “Ultimately, the operation succeeded thanks to luck more than anything else.” This is blatantly wrong. But David should not be surprised that luck played a part. Anyone who has experience in battle knows how crucial it is. . . .

Combat is all about creating luck and getting on top of chaos. As we say in the British army: no plan survives contact with the enemy. That is because, unlike any other human activity, while you try to achieve your task, the enemy is trying to kill you. I have never known any military operation to unfold without foul-ups—often, many of them. . . . One such crisis occurred at Entebbe when a Ugandan soldier challenged the raiding force as they approached their target. A seasoned commander, Netanyahu knew immediately what he had to do—eliminate him. Yet to David, this was a “key error.” The reason? The Ugandan’s actions were a “routine challenge” and he would not have opened fire. This is absurd. The variables were so great and the stakes so high that no commander would take that risk—even if it meant losing surprise. . . .

Above all, to suggest, [as David does], that Netanyahu’s death during the operation meant his impact was negligible is to misunderstand the nature of combat leadership. The influence of the most effective and inspirational commander, as Netanyahu undoubtedly was, does not end even when he is no longer among his men.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Entebbe, Film, Israel & Zionism, Israeli history, Military history

Expand Gaza into Sinai

Feb. 11 2025

Calling the proposal to depopulate Gaza completely (if temporarily) “unworkable,” Peter Berkowitz makes the case for a similar, but more feasible, plan:

The United States along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE should persuade Egypt by means of generous financial inducements to open the sparsely populated ten-to-fifteen miles of Sinai adjacent to Gaza to Palestinians seeking a fresh start and better life. Egypt would not absorb Gazans and make them citizens but rather move Gaza’s border . . . westward into Sinai. Fences would be erected along the new border. The Israel Defense Force would maintain border security on the Gaza-extension side, Egyptian forces on the other. Egypt might lease the land to the Palestinians for 75 years.

The Sinai option does not involve forced transfer of civilian populations, which the international laws of war bar. As the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other partners build temporary dwellings and then apartment buildings and towns, they would provide bus service to the Gaza-extension. Palestinian families that choose to make the short trip would receive a key to a new residence and, say, $10,000.

The Sinai option is flawed. . . . Then again, all conventional options for rehabilitating and governing Gaza are terrible.

Read more at RealClear Politics

More about: Donald Trump, Egypt, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula