The new film 7 Days in Entebbe is based primarily on a book by the historian Saul David about the daring Israeli raid to rescue hostages held at a Ugandan airport in 1976. In a recent interview, David has suggested that the operation—which resulted in the deaths of the terrorists and many of their helpers, three of the 106 hostages, and the raid’s commander Yoni Netanyahu—was something other than a stunning success. Richard Kemp, the former commander of British forces in Afghanistan, comments:

In trying to second-guess [Yoni] Netanyahu’s actions at Entebbe, David shows that even the most assiduous academic cannot necessarily perceive the reality of close military combat. He says: “Ultimately, the operation succeeded thanks to luck more than anything else.” This is blatantly wrong. But David should not be surprised that luck played a part. Anyone who has experience in battle knows how crucial it is. . . .

Combat is all about creating luck and getting on top of chaos. As we say in the British army: no plan survives contact with the enemy. That is because, unlike any other human activity, while you try to achieve your task, the enemy is trying to kill you. I have never known any military operation to unfold without foul-ups—often, many of them. . . . One such crisis occurred at Entebbe when a Ugandan soldier challenged the raiding force as they approached their target. A seasoned commander, Netanyahu knew immediately what he had to do—eliminate him. Yet to David, this was a “key error.” The reason? The Ugandan’s actions were a “routine challenge” and he would not have opened fire. This is absurd. The variables were so great and the stakes so high that no commander would take that risk—even if it meant losing surprise. . . .

Above all, to suggest, [as David does], that Netanyahu’s death during the operation meant his impact was negligible is to misunderstand the nature of combat leadership. The influence of the most effective and inspirational commander, as Netanyahu undoubtedly was, does not end even when he is no longer among his men.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.