From 1985 until 2000, the IDF maintained a buffer zone in southern Lebanon to prevent attacks on its territory by Hizballah and Palestinian groups. Ehud Barak, who withdrew Israeli forces from Lebanon during his tenure as prime minister, recently told an interviewer that he remains “very proud” of the decision. Meir Indor responds:

Barak [claimed] that he succeeded in “stopping what cost many soldiers their lives.” How dishonest and disrespectful is it to disregard the victims of the 2006 Second Lebanon War, who were casualties of that withdrawal? Here is the tally of the casualties: 165 Israeli civilians and soldiers killed and 2,628 injured. In that one war, Barak managed to surpass the number of lives [lost during the fifteen years in which Israel maintained the security zone]. . . .

[Furthermore], when then-Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat saw that the IDF was on the run under Barak’s leadership, he launched a terrorist offensive to kick [Israel] out of Judea and Samaria. Why would an older, more experienced terrorist follow the lead of Hizballah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah if the withdrawal were, [as Barak claims], a success? . . .

Meanwhile, Iran was in the background. Barak was warned [when he was considering withdrawal] that the Iranians wanted to build an army for the Shiites in Lebanon to threaten Israel from the north, in addition to the Palestinian threat from Hamas in the south. This is exactly what happened. It had been impossible for the Shiite terrorist group Hizballah to [organize itself into] an army, [which it now is], so long as the IDF remained in south Lebanon. . . . Hizballah militants even took over [Israeli] bases and appropriated weapons and equipment that was forgotten in the hasty rout [of the IDF]. Pictures of their victory with Hizballah flags raised were seen throughout the Arab world.

Earlier this month, an operative working for, or in conjunction with, Hizballah snuck across the Israel-Lebanese border and planted a sophisticated explosive near the town of Megiddo, which killed a civilian when detonated. On Thursday, another Iranian proxy group launched a drone at a U.S. military base in Syria, killing a contractor and wounding five American soldiers. The former attack appears to be an attempt to change what Israeli officials and analysts call the “rules of the game”: the mutually understood redlines that keep the Jewish state and Hizballah from going to war. Nadav Pollak explains how he believes Jerusalem should respond:

Israel cannot stop at pointing fingers and issuing harsh statements. The Megiddo attack might have caused much more damage given the additional explosives and other weapons the terrorist was carrying; even the lone device detonated at Megiddo could have easily been used to destroy a larger target such as a bus. Moreover, Hizballah’s apparent effort to test (or shift) Jerusalem’s redlines on a dangerous frontier needs to be answered. If [the terrorist group’s leader Hassan] Nasrallah has misjudged Israel, then it is incumbent on Jerusalem to make this clear.

Unfortunately, the days of keeping the north quiet at any cost have passed, especially if Hizballah no longer believes Israel is willing to respond forcefully. The last time the organization perceived Israel to be weak was in 2006, and its resultant cross-border operations (e.g., kidnapping Israeli soldiers) led to a war that proved to be devastating, mostly to Lebanon. If Hizballah tries to challenge Israel again, Israel should be ready to take strong action such as targeting the group’s commanders and headquarters in Lebanon—even if this runs the risk of intense fire exchanges or war.

Relevant preparations for this option should include increased monitoring of Hizballah officials—overtly and covertly—and perhaps even the transfer of some military units to the north. Hizballah needs to know that Israel is no longer shying away from conflict, since this may be the only way of forcing the group to return to the old, accepted rules of the game and step down from the precipice of a war that it does not appear to want.