On June 15, the U.S.-based far-left New Israel Fund (NIF) distributed a press release decrying a proposal before Israel’s legislature to outlaw the filming of Israeli soldiers. Left-wing activists and journalists quickly joined in denouncing an authoritarian assault on freedom of speech by preventing news coverage of allegedly misbehaving troops; a major television channel aired a heated debate over the bill between an activist and a right-wing politician. Two days later NIF claimed that the bill had made it through the committee—the first of four votes required for such a bill to become law—and was on its way to making it through the Knesset. But, writes Haviv Rettig Gur, the entire episode was a sham:

[The parliamentarian] Robert Ilatov did, in fact, pen [such] a bill. . . . But he didn’t do so because he thought it might pass, or even because he wanted it to pass. As anyone with more than a [little] familiarity with Israeli politics . . . can attest, right-wing lawmakers use such bills to get their names in the newspaper in a nation where news events come at a fevered pace and no mere press release from a junior politician has much hope of getting noticed. The most effective way to get noticed, right-wing lawmakers have discovered, is to trigger the left into a public-relations campaign against them. . . .

The fact that his bill forbidding all filming of IDF soldiers had no hope of becoming the law of the land was the only reason Ilatov allowed himself to propose it in the first place. . . .

As for the bill that made it through the June 17 committee meeting, it no longer forbids filming IDF soldiers. Any filming, for it to become illegal under the stipulations of the new bill, would have to be part of an activist’s already-illegal efforts to obstruct the soldiers’ work. . . . Even now, with the bill so thoroughly gutted as to be unrecognizable, it is not at all clear it can pass in the Knesset. Even the Jewish Home party, the farthest right one gets in the current Knesset, isn’t eager to support it. . . .

[Yet] just about everyone got what they wanted [from the exercise]: the bill’s supporters got to pretend they were defending Israel’s soldiers, and in the bargain that they’re just illiberal enough to satisfy a right-wing base that dislikes liberal pearl-clutching. The NIF and [the Israeli human-rights group] B’Tselem dutifully supplied the pearl-clutching about “tyrants” and got to pretend in their turn that they alone stood athwart history, holding aloft the torch of transparency and liberty in a slowly darkening world. For organizations that fundraise among low-information foreign donors, it’s hard to imagine a better narrative. . . .

But there were losers, too, in this exercise. Israel as a whole, of course, was depicted by its own lawmakers as a nation that could seek to prevent citizens from filming misbehaving troops. [And] IDF soldiers [were] besmirched by the claim that their “morale” is so fragile and their behavior so troubling that photographing them should carry a ten-year prison term.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.