While the U.S. has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—as the nuclear agreement with Tehran is formally known—the Islamic Republic’s response still remains unclear. Michael Herzog believes it unlikely that the ayatollahs will be content either to do nothing or to renegotiate the terms of the deal. He writes:
The more likely scenario is that Iran will resume its nuclear activities with regard to [uranium] enrichment, albeit slowly and gradually, at each phase [observing] the international and domestic response [before] deciding how to proceed. There is a range of activities they can undertake, starting with the . . . less risky part of the spectrum, and then possibly escalating. The more extreme measures of withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stopping all cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), kicking out inspectors, and going underground with its nuclear program are less likely in the foreseeable future because they enhance the risk of a U.S. or Israeli military response and they will bring about loss of European support.
More likely is that Iran decides to enrich uranium up to 20 percent using new types of centrifuges and continues to work with the IAEA on its own terms—allowing limited inspections of declared sites. As major sanctions are kicking in regardless, the Iranians don’t have much to lose economically, but their continued cooperation with the IAEA may make it harder [for Israel or the U.S.] to decide on military action against them.
Once Iran resumes its nuclear program outside the scope of the JCPOA, both the U.S. and Israel will have to redefine their red lines concerning the Iranian nuclear program, namely where to draw a line, the crossing of which would trigger a military response against Iran. . . .
[O]ne also has to follow carefully the unfolding diplomatic process between the U.S. and North Korea. Everyone, including the Iranians, is watching very closely, and the situation in the Middle East will be [affected] by what develops in the Korean peninsula. If there is a real agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea, including credible inspections inside the country, then this will strengthen the U.S.’s hand vis-à-vis Iran. If, on the other hand, a weak deal with North Korea emerges that leaves its [nuclear] infrastructure and capabilities in place, this may strengthen the Iranians vis-à-vis the international community.
Read more on Fathom: http://fathomjournal.org/where-next-for-the-iran-nuclear-deal-a-view-from-israel-by-michael-herzog/