On October 6, 1973, a surprise attack launched simultaneously by Syria and Egypt caught the Jewish state woefully off guard—and not only because much of the country was in synagogue, or fasting. The defense establishment had missed or flat-out ignored warning signs of an impending war, and in the first few days of the conflict Israel’s existence seemed seriously threatened. This led to bitter postwar recriminations that have remained salient in the country’s collective memory. But, to Eyal Zisser, far more significant was the war’s outcome:

In very short order, the IDF launched a counterattack that took it to the outskirts of Damascus and the west bank of the Suez Canal and a mere 62 miles from Cairo, the Egyptian capital. Additionally, the Egyptian Third Army was completely besieged by Israeli forces, on the verge of utter collapse and surrender.

At that very point in time, on the precipice of the enemy’s complete ruination, the war ended. The enemy had been stopped in its tracks, pushed back, severely pummeled and was staring at annihilation. Due to extenuating diplomatic considerations, however—among them, for example, the lack of awareness on the Israeli side of just how close the enemy was to its breaking point—the Israeli government ceded to U.S. pressure and agreed to a cease-fire.

Israel’s military victory was strategically significant. A direct line stretches from the Yom Kippur War to the Camp David Accords with Egypt. It’s likely that a peace deal of such magnitude would never have been attained had Egypt’s political and military echelon not felt the weight of Israel’s force and determination [and] become convinced that Israel could not be defeated on the field of battle. The quiet that has persevered on the Golan Heights for over 40 years—including Damascus’ self-restraint every time the IDF attacks on its soil—is [also] due to the results of the Yom Kippur War and the steep price paid by the Syrians.

For several years now, however, Israel has elected to ignore these unprecedented images of victory and instead to sink [into] sorrow and despair [reflecting] the fiascos and failures of the war’s first days. The Soviets didn’t conduct themselves this way after World War II, which caught them off guard and exacted a horrific price; and it’s not how the Americans choose to remember the end of their war against Japan, which began in total surprise and failure at Pearl Harbor and also exacted a heavy price.

[Likewise], there is no reason for the younger generation of Israelis to be raised on an imaginary story of defeat, and there’s no reason to forget the most important lesson from that war—that determination and military might are necessary to survive in our region and to attain the peace for which we all yearn.

Established in 2012 and maintaining branches in Europe, North America, and Iran, the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Network claims its goal is merely to show “solidarity” for imprisoned Palestinians. The organization’s leader, however, has admitted to being a representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a notorious terrorist group whose most recent accomplishments include murdering a seventeen-year-old girl. As Arsen Ostrovsky and Patricia Teitelbaum point out, Samidoun is just one example of how the European Union allows Iran-backed terrorists to operate in its midst:

The PFLP is a proxy of the Iranian regime, which provides the terror group with money, training, and weapons. Samidoun . . . has a branch in Tehran. It has even held events there, under the pretext of “cultural activity,” to elicit support for operations in Europe. Its leader, Khaled Barakat, is a regular on Iran’s state [channel] PressTV, calling for violence and lauding Iran’s involvement in the region. It is utterly incomprehensible, therefore, that the EU has not yet designated Samidoun a terror group.

According to the Council of the European Union, groups and/or individuals can be added to the EU terror list on the basis of “proposals submitted by member states based on a decision by a competent authority of a member state or a third country.” In this regard, there is already a standing designation by Israel of Samidoun as a terror group and a decision of a German court finding Barakat to be a senior PFLP operative.

Given the irrefutable axis-of-terror between Samidoun, PFLP, and the Iranian regime, the EU has a duty to put Samidoun and senior Samidoun leaders on the EU terror list. It should do this not as some favor to Israel, but because otherwise it continues to turn a blind eye to a group that presents a clear and present security threat to the European Union and EU citizens.