In 1967, Israel seized the Golan—an area inhabited by Jews since biblical times—in a battle initiated by Syria, and in 1981 formally applied its laws there. Yet, as late as 2011, the U.S. was encouraging Jerusalem to negotiate the return of the territory to Damascus in exchange for promises of peace. To Rafael Bardaji and Richard Kemp, it is high time for both Washington and its allies to admit that the Jewish state’s continued control of the Golan is most conducive to regional stability:

As part of the Arab League, Syrian forces launched an invasion of northern Israel across the Golan Heights in June 1948. After the 1949 armistice, there were years of sporadic attacks against Israel from the Golan, including cross-border raids by Fatah and shelling of civilian communities by the Syrian army. Syria intensified its artillery fire against Israel at the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967. . . .

Recognition by the international community [of Israel’s control of the Golan] would not encourage wars of aggression but, on the contrary, would deter them. Returning the Golan Heights to Syria would not only endanger Israel and against their will consign the 25,000 Druze living there to the depredations of President Assad; but it would also send the message that an aggressor has nothing to lose as there is no territorial price to pay for its violent actions.

Western support for Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights would equally extract a price from Assad—albeit a comparatively small one—for the war he has waged against his own people in which millions have suffered and perhaps half a million died. In this, the West has plenty of words but few tools at its disposal. Rejecting Assad’s claim on the Golan Heights is one of them, especially as he now seems set to retain virtually all of the status quo ante even after the monstrous war crimes he has committed.

But such a move by the West would be much more than just a rap on the knuckles; it would also be an expression of the new reality. In the past Israel offered Syria the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, but its offers were always rejected. Many Western experts and governments naïvely viewed Assad as a potential partner for peace with Israel. The events of the last seven years have proved beyond all doubt that he is nothing other than a murderous despot who must not be given any opportunity for further aggression. This is really the crux of the issue: Western action now could make a concrete contribution to preventing conflict in the future.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.