For the Sake of Peace, the West Should Recognize Israeli Sovereignty over the Golan Heights

In 1967, Israel seized the Golan—an area inhabited by Jews since biblical times—in a battle initiated by Syria, and in 1981 formally applied its laws there. Yet, as late as 2011, the U.S. was encouraging Jerusalem to negotiate the return of the territory to Damascus in exchange for promises of peace. To Rafael Bardaji and Richard Kemp, it is high time for both Washington and its allies to admit that the Jewish state’s continued control of the Golan is most conducive to regional stability:

As part of the Arab League, Syrian forces launched an invasion of northern Israel across the Golan Heights in June 1948. After the 1949 armistice, there were years of sporadic attacks against Israel from the Golan, including cross-border raids by Fatah and shelling of civilian communities by the Syrian army. Syria intensified its artillery fire against Israel at the outbreak of the Six-Day War in 1967. . . .

Recognition by the international community [of Israel’s control of the Golan] would not encourage wars of aggression but, on the contrary, would deter them. Returning the Golan Heights to Syria would not only endanger Israel and against their will consign the 25,000 Druze living there to the depredations of President Assad; but it would also send the message that an aggressor has nothing to lose as there is no territorial price to pay for its violent actions.

Western support for Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights would equally extract a price from Assad—albeit a comparatively small one—for the war he has waged against his own people in which millions have suffered and perhaps half a million died. In this, the West has plenty of words but few tools at its disposal. Rejecting Assad’s claim on the Golan Heights is one of them, especially as he now seems set to retain virtually all of the status quo ante even after the monstrous war crimes he has committed.

But such a move by the West would be much more than just a rap on the knuckles; it would also be an expression of the new reality. In the past Israel offered Syria the Golan Heights in exchange for peace, but its offers were always rejected. Many Western experts and governments naïvely viewed Assad as a potential partner for peace with Israel. The events of the last seven years have proved beyond all doubt that he is nothing other than a murderous despot who must not be given any opportunity for further aggression. This is really the crux of the issue: Western action now could make a concrete contribution to preventing conflict in the future.

Read more at Colonel Richard Kemp

More about: Bashar al-Assad, Golan Heights, Israel & Zionism, Syrian civil war

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF