Currently the Palestinian branch of Defense for Children International—an organization founded in 1979 to combat the human trafficking of minors—is running a “no way to treat a child” campaign to combat fictitious mistreatment of Palestinian children by the IDF. The group, which goes by the acronym DCI-P, has exploited its connection with its parent organization to receive funding and other support from EU institutions and such Western philanthropies as the American Friends Service Committee. But, as Emily Benedek details, DCI-P has such extensive links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—the group responsible for the Lod Airport massacre, the hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, and many other acts of terror—that it could reasonably described as the PFLP’s propaganda arm:

The Palestinian branch of DCI, DCI-P, founded in 1991, asserts that although it has pledged to “follow DCI’s mandate to ‘promote and protect children’s rights in accordance with international standards,’” it reserves the right to go its own way, by “autonomously” developing its own programs. . . .

The relationship [between DCI-P and the PFLP was likely] unknown [to] Congresswoman Betty McCollum of Minnesota, who sponsored a bill about Palestinian children that was largely written by DCIP. McCollum introduced this bill in November 2017—HR-4391, “The Promoting of Human Rights by Ending Israeli Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act”—which would prohibit “U.S. assistance to Israel from being used to support the military detention, interrogation, or ill-treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law.”

What the PFLP has not achieved through terror alone, it may now be attempting to achieve through the manipulation of international aid organizations and the language of humanitarian concern for the welfare of children.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.