Currently the Palestinian branch of Defense for Children International—an organization founded in 1979 to combat the human trafficking of minors—is running a “no way to treat a child” campaign to combat fictitious mistreatment of Palestinian children by the IDF. The group, which goes by the acronym DCI-P, has exploited its connection with its parent organization to receive funding and other support from EU institutions and such Western philanthropies as the American Friends Service Committee. But, as Emily Benedek details, DCI-P has such extensive links to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)—the group responsible for the Lod Airport massacre, the hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, and many other acts of terror—that it could reasonably described as the PFLP’s propaganda arm:

The Palestinian branch of DCI, DCI-P, founded in 1991, asserts that although it has pledged to “follow DCI’s mandate to ‘promote and protect children’s rights in accordance with international standards,’” it reserves the right to go its own way, by “autonomously” developing its own programs. . . .

The relationship [between DCI-P and the PFLP was likely] unknown [to] Congresswoman Betty McCollum of Minnesota, who sponsored a bill about Palestinian children that was largely written by DCIP. McCollum introduced this bill in November 2017—HR-4391, “The Promoting of Human Rights by Ending Israeli Military Detention of Palestinian Children Act”—which would prohibit “U.S. assistance to Israel from being used to support the military detention, interrogation, or ill-treatment of Palestinian children in violation of international humanitarian law.”

What the PFLP has not achieved through terror alone, it may now be attempting to achieve through the manipulation of international aid organizations and the language of humanitarian concern for the welfare of children.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.