As Jerusalem, via Egyptian mediators, tries to negotiate an end to the ongoing crisis in Gaza, Israeli officials have floated various options for improving the humanitarian and economic circumstances in the territory. Eran Lerman argues that such arrangements, if properly carried out, shouldn’t be seen as concessions to Hamas. However, he warns of three pitfalls Israel must avoid:
The first [pitfall involves] the need to bring back to Israel the bodies of the two soldiers, Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, [both captured in 2014], and the two [Israeli] civilians who crossed the border (of their own volition) and are being held by Hamas. It is important to uproot from Hamas’s consciousness the expectation that Israel will again be extorted as it was [following the 2006 kidnapping of Gilad Shalit, who was returned in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners in 2011]. It is also important that this question, with all of its emotional power, not be the sole consideration [when Israel makes decisions] of strategic significance.
The second threat is likely to come from rebellious groups in Gaza, especially Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which has a military branch in Gaza and is liable to resort to large-scale violent provocations should this be the wish of its patrons in Tehran. The Egyptians will have to make it unmistakably clear to Hamas that a cease-fire agreement requires active enforcement of the arrangement against PIJ and other rebellious groups.
The third difficulty, and the main one at this stage, results from the cruel use the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas is making of his legal authority . . . to thwart economic relief for the population of the Gaza Strip so long as the PA and Abbas’s Fatah party have not regained control of the territory. The same Dr. Jekyll/President Abbas who is showing cooperation, moderation, and largeness of spirit to his guests from the Israeli left is behaving like Mr. Hyde/Fatah functionary Abbas by holding the entire population of the Gaza Strip hostage until he obtains his objectives. . . . Under these circumstances, it is possible that there will be no alternative to finding mechanisms to bypass Abbas in order to carry out the relief measures, even if the “reconciliation talks” [between Fatah and Hamas] in Cairo remain deadlocked (as expected).
Read more on Jerusalem Institute for Strategic Studies: https://jiss.org.il/en/lerman-gaza-and-the-middle-east-camp-of-stability/