After Hamas, the most important political (and terrorist) organization in the Gaza Strip is Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—which, like Hizballah in Lebanon and various militias in Iraq, is an Iranian proxy. Khaled Abu Toameh explains the threat the group poses:

PIJ . . . is responsible for hundreds of terrorist attacks against Israel, including suicide bombings. In recent years, the group has also been launching rockets and mortars at Israel. Although it considers itself an independent group, PIJ often operates in coordination with Hamas. The two groups even have a joint-operations command to coordinate their attacks on Israel. Sometimes, they carry out joint attacks. . . .

Hamas does not tolerate competition from other armed groups in the Gaza Strip, but when it comes to PIJ and its military wing, the story is altogether different. When PIJ displays its power and weapons on the streets of Gaza, Hamas shuts up about it, [since] Hamas is aware that meddling with PIJ means getting into trouble with PIJ’s paymasters in Iran. Like PIJ, Hamas is dependent on Iran’s political, financial, and military backing. [Yet] Iran considers PIJ its main ally and puppet in the Gaza Strip. Through PIJ, Iran inserts its tentacles into the internal affairs of the Palestinians. . . .

Despite the apparent rapprochement [with Hamas after a rift over the Syrian civil war], Iran has strong reservations about trusting the organization. Its skepticism appears based on Iran’s fear that Hamas is ready to reach a reconciliation agreement with Fatah and a truce accord with Israel. Such an alliance, in the eyes of Iran, would constitute a betrayal on the part of Hamas. Any agreement with Fatah would mean that Hamas is prepared to join forces with Abbas and, even worse, engage in future peace talks with Israel. . . .

Even if Hamas were to be removed from power, the Palestinians would continue to suffer under other radical groups such as the PIJ. Second, even if Hamas were to wake up tomorrow morning and have an about-face, striking a genuine truce with Israel, there will always be other terrorist groups that are prepared to breach the agreement any time they wish. . . . These are crucial factors that need to be taken into account by any international party that seeks a solution to the catastrophe called Gaza.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”