Since 2010, the Israeli government has been trying to relocate the residents of the Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar—located in part of the West Bank left by the Oslo Accords under direct Israeli (rather than Palestinian Authority) control—because most of the houses there were built illegally. Last May, the dispute reached the Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled that the government could move ahead with the village’s demolition. Benjamin Netanyahu, however, ordered a halt to the demolition last week. Prior to this order, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued a report criticizing Israel over the Khan al-Ahmar issue. Alan Baker notes the shoddy legal thinking behind this condemnation:

[The prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda,] pointed out that extensive destruction of property without military necessity, and population transfers in occupied territory, constitute war crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC [and] threatened to “take appropriate action [in accordance with] . . . my mandate under the Rome Statute.” . . . . Curiously, she added that such action by her would respect the “principle of complementarity.” . . .

The “principle of complementarity” . . . is the basic, underlying requirement of the 1998 Rome Statute. . . . It determines that the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction regarding the most serious crimes of international concern “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.” This means that the ICC may not take action on a complaint referred to it if the courts at the national level are dealing, or have dealt with, the particular case. . . .

In fact, the Khan al-Ahmar situation represents a classical example of complementarity inasmuch as it addresses violations, by the residents of the village, of building, planning, and zoning requirements. The issue was duly referred to and dealt with by Israel’s courts. As is widely publicized, attempts to reach an acceptable compromise regarding an alternative site close to the village—constructed in accordance with planning and zoning requirements, with connection to the electricity and water infrastructures—are still ongoing, without any need for warnings by and intervention of the ICC prosecutor. . . .

The extensive publicity and public-relations campaigns by the Palestinian leadership—connected to their periodic and highly publicized meetings with, and complaints to, the prosecutor against any and most actions by Israel—would give the impression that the Palestinians have adopted the ICC as their own . . . Israel-bashing tribunal. . . . The fact that Prosecutor Bensouda, pursuant to the incessant Palestinian lobbying and harassment, has found it necessary [on multiple occasions] to issue criticism of and warnings to Israel, and to intercede in an ongoing situation regarding Khan al-Ahmar, would appear to reflect [badly] on her impartiality and independence and as such, on her capability to fulfill the important function of ICC prosecutor.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.