Since 2010, the Israeli government has been trying to relocate the residents of the Bedouin village of Khan al-Ahmar—located in part of the West Bank left by the Oslo Accords under direct Israeli (rather than Palestinian Authority) control—because most of the houses there were built illegally. Last May, the dispute reached the Israeli Supreme Court, which ruled that the government could move ahead with the village’s demolition. Benjamin Netanyahu, however, ordered a halt to the demolition last week. Prior to this order, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued a report criticizing Israel over the Khan al-Ahmar issue. Alan Baker notes the shoddy legal thinking behind this condemnation:

[The prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda,] pointed out that extensive destruction of property without military necessity, and population transfers in occupied territory, constitute war crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC [and] threatened to “take appropriate action [in accordance with] . . . my mandate under the Rome Statute.” . . . . Curiously, she added that such action by her would respect the “principle of complementarity.” . . .

The “principle of complementarity” . . . is the basic, underlying requirement of the 1998 Rome Statute. . . . It determines that the exercise by the court of its jurisdiction regarding the most serious crimes of international concern “shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.” This means that the ICC may not take action on a complaint referred to it if the courts at the national level are dealing, or have dealt with, the particular case. . . .

In fact, the Khan al-Ahmar situation represents a classical example of complementarity inasmuch as it addresses violations, by the residents of the village, of building, planning, and zoning requirements. The issue was duly referred to and dealt with by Israel’s courts. As is widely publicized, attempts to reach an acceptable compromise regarding an alternative site close to the village—constructed in accordance with planning and zoning requirements, with connection to the electricity and water infrastructures—are still ongoing, without any need for warnings by and intervention of the ICC prosecutor. . . .

The extensive publicity and public-relations campaigns by the Palestinian leadership—connected to their periodic and highly publicized meetings with, and complaints to, the prosecutor against any and most actions by Israel—would give the impression that the Palestinians have adopted the ICC as their own . . . Israel-bashing tribunal. . . . The fact that Prosecutor Bensouda, pursuant to the incessant Palestinian lobbying and harassment, has found it necessary [on multiple occasions] to issue criticism of and warnings to Israel, and to intercede in an ongoing situation regarding Khan al-Ahmar, would appear to reflect [badly] on her impartiality and independence and as such, on her capability to fulfill the important function of ICC prosecutor.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.