The International Criminal Court’s Record on Israel Reveals Its Underlying Flaws

In a public speech earlier this month, the American national-security adviser John Bolton sharply criticized the International Criminal Court (ICC) and threatened retaliation should it try to prosecute the U.S. or Israel. As Evelyn Gordon notes, multiple complaints against Israel have been submitted to the court, and its judges have twice failed to respect basic principles of impartiality with regard to those complaints. In one instance, the pre-trial chamber—tasked with determining whether charges filed by the prosecutor are sufficient to necessitate a trial—rejected the prosecutor’s own decision that Israel’s actions didn’t justify prosecution. And the court made an even more outrageous move in July:

Without waiting for [the ICC’s prosecutor Fatou] Bensouda to conclude any of her other Israel-related probes (the Palestinian Authority inundates her with complaints), the pre-trial chamber ordered the court’s registry to establish “a system of public information and outreach activities for the benefit of the victims and affected communities in the situation in Palestine,” open an “informative page” on the court’s website exclusively for Palestinians, and report to the chamber on these operations every three months with the goal of creating a “continuous system of interaction between the Court and victims, residing within or outside of Palestine.”

Bensouda has yet to conclude that any crime even occurred, much less that the court has jurisdiction over it (which is far from self-evident). Moreover, the judges have yet to see any evidence in the cases at issue. Yet by declaring the Palestinians to be victims to whom the court must reach out, they have effectively announced that they’re already convinced both that crimes have occurred and that they’re within the court’s jurisdiction. And if the judges have decided all this without even bothering to review any evidence, how could they possibly be trusted to evaluate the evidence fairly should Bensouda actually file charges?

Moreover, by twice sending Bensouda clear signals that they want her to indict Israel, the judges have undermined her credibility as an independent prosecutor. If she ever does file such charges, will it be because she truly considers them justified or only because it’s easier to placate the judges above her than to keep defying them?

Thus the court’s track record on Israel alone provides ample justification for Bolton’s broadside against it. Indeed, it ought to concern many countries since a court that’s biased against one country can’t be trusted to eschew bias against others. . . . And by refusing to overlook that uncomfortable fact—by refusing to grant a travesty of justice the honor due the real thing—America is upholding its highest ideals.

Read more at Evelyn Gordon

More about: ICC, Israel & Zionism, John Bolton, U.S. Foreign policy

Israel’s Strategic Gamble in Lebanon

Nov. 13 2024

Yesterday, Hizballah fired over 80 rockets into Israel, one of which killed two civilians in the city of Nahariya. Further disaster was narrowly avoided when one of the terrorist group’s attack drones exploded near a kindergarten in Haifa, from which children had been evacuated just in the nick of time. Iran’s Lebanese proxy thus continues to demonstrate that, battered though it may be, it can still do considerable damage, although it has not been able to carry out the overwhelming and devastating barrages that Israeli experts once feared.

Eran Ortal examines the progress of Israel’s Third Lebanon War, assessing that the IDF’s goal is not to encircle and destroy Hizballah’s military forces, but to destroy its infrastructure while avoiding combat. Ortal considers the merits of this approach:

Despite the inherent risks, the strategy of clearing a narrow buffer strip and ending the war in the north with an agreement is a legitimate choice. Hizballah’s southern army is a significant military threat capable of exacting a heavy price from the IDF. Hizballah knows full well that after a year of fighting in Gaza, the IDF is not the fresh, capable army, armed to the teeth and furious, that it was at the beginning of the war. It is very possible that the enemy will cooperate with the plan and take the chance of preserving its power over an attempt to restore its lost dignity. It is also possible that that is Iran’s directive.

The current strategy strives to shorten the long war we [Israelis] have fallen into. The thinking underlying this strategy is that the current Lebanon war will not be the last. As ever, Hizballah will prepare for the next war while learning from its failures in the current round. In the future, Israel will not be able to assume that a series of secret operations will provide it with the same benefits.

If Israel does find itself preparing for another round of conflict, Ortal goes on to argue, it must be ready for a military confrontation, not a counterterrorism operation.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Hizballah, Israeli Security, Lebanon