Last week, Egypt finally succeeded in brokering a long-awaited agreement whereby Hamas would accept $15 million from Qatar in exchange for an end to eight months of low-grade violence and rioting. But on Friday—after the cash-filled suitcases had already arrived in Gaza—a terrorist from the Strip snuck into Israel and burned down a greenhouse before being apprehended. On Sunday, an Israeli commando unit operating in Gaza—most likely on an intelligence-gathering mission—got into a shootout with Hamas operatives in which an Israeli officer was killed. Hamas then launched hundreds of rockets into Israel yesterday afternoon. David Horovitz comments:

The riots and the tunneling and the rocket fire [orchestrated by Hamas] amount to extortion. If Israel does not end the security blockade it maintains on Gaza, Hamas vows, then Israelis will have to continue to endure rocket and mortar attacks, the threat of cross-border terror tunnels, arson balloons burning its fields. But if Israel does ease the security blockade, of course, Hamas will exploit this to import more weaponry to cause still-greater harm. . . .

In repeated flareups since the 2014 warfare, Israel has sought to avoid the loss of life and devastation that a resort to deeper conflict will entail. Israel is also well aware that “defeating Hamas” may sound straightforward but is immensely complex. The military challenge is profound, though emphatically not beyond the capabilities of Israel’s military forces. But Israel does not want to reconquer Gaza and reassert responsibility for two million hostile Palestinians.

Yet Hamas will not rest, and will not change, and sooner or later, therefore, must be faced down. And in the battle between a sovereign state that is obligated to ensure security for its citizens, and a ruthless, cynical terrorist organization, backed by Iran and committed to Israel’s destruction, there can and must be only one winner.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.