Hamas Can’t Disrupt Flights to Tel Aviv—Unless the West Cooperates

Amid the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Gaza in November, Hamas threatened to target Ben-Gurion airport with its rockets; Israeli authorities responded by rerouting some flights without causing any serious disruption to business as usual. But earlier, during the brief 2014 war, when a rocket from Gaza landed a mile from the airport, the Obama administration quickly suspended U.S. flights to Israel for a few days and the EU just as quickly followed suit. Raphael Bouchnik-Chen comments:

Hamas learned [in 2014] that it can leverage flight restrictions to its advantage, even if only as a propaganda factor. If it so much as mentions Ben-Gurion airport in the context of potential retaliation targets, Israel has to take notice and will therefore be deterred.

Technically speaking, Hamas missiles and rockets are indeed capable of reaching a radius beyond 70 km, potentially threatening much of Israel, [the airport included]. This was demonstrated in 2014, though most of the missiles and rockets fired toward Tel Aviv were intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome. Still, it is rational to wonder whether this hazard turned out to be a critical factor that caused Israeli decision-makers to advocate for military restraint [last month, despite] Hamas’s provocations. . . .

In practical terms, the flight bans imposed in 2014 . . . were drastically and needlessly overdramatic. . . . The double standard put on display during these events was manifested once again very recently, when ballistic-missile barrages were launched on an almost daily basis by the Yemenite Houthi rebels toward several Saudi main airports. No flight prohibitions were even considered in light of these attacks. . . .

The flight prohibition enforced on Ben-Gurion Airport in 2014 was a form of political pressure exerted on Israel by the Obama administration to stop the Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip, not a reflection of genuine safety concerns. This suggests that Hamas’s threats to “close the Israeli sky” are little more than mere propaganda.

Unfortunately, if American or European governments want to punish or pressure Jerusalem, they can follow President Obama’s example and use Hamas’s threats as a pretext.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Barack Obama, Ben Gurion Airport, Hamas, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security