Sunday and Monday saw an unusual exchange of fire between Israel and its enemies in Syria: first because the IDF struck its targets during the daytime rather than at night, and second because of the intense response from Iran and its allies, which included launching a missile at the Mount Hermon ski resort. These attacks come in the context of Jerusalem’s new willingness to claim responsibility for its strikes on Iranian targets in Syria. Considering Israeli strategy in this ongoing low-grade conflict, Ron Tira stresses the importance of not simply eliminating particular targets but of deterring Iran in its quest to transform Syria into the new front line of its war on the Jewish state:
The establishment of a network of precision missiles by Iran and Hizballah on Israel’s borders could give [the two] the ability to deliver a paralyzing blow against [Israeli] civil and military systems, causing enormous damage and changing the strategic equation in the theater. To be sure, this threat is not as severe as [that of a hostile power acquiring nuclear weapons], but neither is it akin to the threat posed by a buildup of weapons intended for warfare between armies or of [imprecise] weapons aimed at the home front. This is a new category of threat, and because of its severity, the overarching response must be one of prevention rather than of delay, containment, preemptive strike, or active and passive defense. . . .
In order to achieve prevention, Israel’s goals must be twofold. First, it must force the relevant actors to change their policy. Iran and Hizballah must suspend or abandon their drive to establish a network of precision weapons on Israel’s border, and the Syrian regime and Russia must actively oppose any further such efforts by Iran and Hizballah. Second, Israel must continue to deter any renewed attempts by Iran and Hizballah for the long term. . . .
Accordingly, . . . Israel must demonstrate to its enemies the potential for escalation and regional instability caused by the positioning of high-quality Iranian weapons in Syria. . . . It must also continue attacks despite increased risks and resistance. . . . If properly handled, the growing friction with the Syrian regime . . . could actually help to implement the strategy described above. The direct military hostilities with Iran (such as the events of February 10 and May 10, 2018 and January 21, 2019) in Israel’s backyard, over 900 miles from Tehran, [takes place in an area] where Israel has a clear advantage. Perhaps, therefore, [Iranian and Syrian retaliation and escalation] is not a risk to be avoided but rather an advantage to be exploited.
Read more on Institute for the Study of War: http://www.inss.org.il/publication/israeli-strategy-response-changes-syrian-arena/