On Monday, the British government declared Hizballah a terrorist organization. Ariel Kahana argues that this long-overdue measure was precipitated by London’s decision to leave the European Union. That decision, he believes, has been followed by “continuous improvement in Britain’s approach to Israel”:

The incessant refusal of Germany, France, Italy, and of course the EU itself to define the murderous organization accurately is the height of folly. Because the Europeans haven’t only failed to call Hizballah by its name—a terrorist organization—but have sought to whitewash their collective conscience by concocting a flimsy distinction between its “military wing,” which they have outlawed, and its “diplomatic wing,” which they maintain is legitimate. This distinction doesn’t exist and Hizballah itself rejects it. . . .

The Europeans know all this, but as usual, they are playing make-believe. . . . Were it not for their expected exit from the EU, we can assume that the British, too, would still be playing pretend. These are the rules of the EU, which imposes a uniform foreign policy on all of its members. . . .

Thank heaven indeed for allowing us to reach this day. A few years ago, it was revealed that in the 1970s, Europe embraced Yasir Arafat because it feared the PLO would carry out terrorist attacks on its soil. It isn’t a stretch to assume that today, too, the EU’s untruthful position is guided by dread of potential Hizballah attacks. Some fears can only be cured by Brexit.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.