On March 10, Mahmoud Abbas appointed Muhammad Shtayyeh the new prime minister of the Palestinian Authority (PA), replacing Rami Hamdallah who had tendered his resignation in January. Pinḥas Inbari explains the political considerations behind Shtayyeh’s appointment and the challenges he faces in forming a new government. At issue are the tensions between Abbas’s ruling Fatah faction and the other groups that make up the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

Shtayyeh is not [considered] a Fatah “fighter,” [since he has not] spent time in an Israeli prison. . . . Fatah’s main concern now is that its senior officials be promoted to key positions [in preparation for] the day after Mahmoud Abbas [dies or otherwise leaves office]. . . . The reason Abbas is not interested in promoting any of the senior Fatah fighters is to avoid inflaming the succession struggle now.

Instead of a Fatah government as such, Abbas is more interested in a PLO government [that includes other factions] due to his struggle with Hamas over the legitimacy of the PLO’s authority. . . . But here lies the main problem: [the other] leading PLO organizations, including the Popular Front, the Democratic Front, and Islamic Jihad, are aligned with Hamas rather than with Ramallah. It is now taken for granted that they will not join Shtayyeh’s new government. . . .

It is [nevertheless] expected that Shtayyeh will “open the door” to those organizations, which are terrorist according to every conceivable definition, thereby putting the continuation of international financial aid to Ramallah at risk. . . .

All of the above is linked to the Jerusalem issue. Ramallah wants to make the fight for Jerusalem the leading national struggle, while for Hamas, the central battle is along the borders. Abbas’s aim is to attract the PLO organizations to join Ramallah at the expense of Gaza.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.