Iran’s Militias in Iraq Threaten Israel

March 8 2019

Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Tehran began organizing and arming Iraqi Shiite militias to fight the U.S. and its allies and to undermine the newly emergent government. These forces went on to play a key role in the fight against Islamic State (IS) and, to a lesser extent, against rebel forces in Syria. In collaboration with other Iranian proxies, they have secured control over both sides of an important border area between the two countries—operating, as always, under the direction of the Islamic Republic. It is likely, according to Lazar Berman and Jonathan Spyer, that the militias will next be used against Israel:

[Israel’s] next war in the north may well be a long slog in which its advantages in firepower and numbers only come into play after the IDF wears down and begins to break apart Hizballah’s rocket array and ground forces. . . . But when Hizballah enjoys an Iranian-controlled corridor through which thousands of combat veterans from the Shiite militias can flow, Hizballah fighters will be in a position to withstand much more. . . . So long as they believe that help is potentially on the way, they will likely keep firing. . . .

Israel’s ground forces—in terms of actual combat soldiers—are smaller than many realize, even with the reserves activated. Israel will need significant ground forces if it intends to capture the territory from which Hizballah rockets are launched at Israel. . . . This overstretched ground force will be under even more stress when thousands of Shiite militiamen are thrown into the fight.

Of course, the Shiite militias have never faced an enemy like the IDF in open warfare. Any attempt to rely on ground maneuver as they did successfully in Iraq [against IS] will turn into target practice for Israeli air and armored forces. They will be fighting a highly advanced, highly capable military that is able to target them rapidly with massive firepower. . . . Still, if the Shiite militias learn from Hizballah, and use pre-prepared defenses and tunnels to ambush advancing IDF ground troops, and remain largely underground or in urban areas, they will make Israel’s already daunting challenge in Lebanon even more difficult.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Hizballah, Iran, Iraq, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security, Syria

In an Effort at Reform, Mahmoud Abbas Names an Ex-Terrorist His Deputy President

April 28 2025

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Authority, PLO