Since weekly violent demonstrations began along the Gaza security fence in March 2018, Hamas has insisted that these are popularly organized, peaceful protests. Neither claim is true. A detailed report by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center shows that Hamas carefully established, and tightly controls, the “Supreme National Authority of the Return Marches and Lifting the Siege,” which masquerades as a civic organization coordinating the protests. It has likewise distributed terrorists among masses of peaceful demonstrators:

Hamas . . . determines the nature of the marches and regulates their level of violence, in accordance with its strategy and its changing tactical considerations. It is Hamas that gives the marches their organizational, logistical, political, and media framework, based on the resources at its disposal as the largest and dominant organization in the Gaza Strip. In addition, Hamas operatives are those who are close to the border fence and engage in clashes with the IDF. Among the operatives who died during the marches, Hamas operatives constitute the highest percentage. The Supreme National Authority is composed of the terrorist organizations operating in the Gaza Strip. . . .

The marches are accompanied by a variety of violent actions whose nature and scope occasionally change [according to Hamas’s decrees]: stone throwing; throwing Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices; shooting at IDF forces; damaging the border fence; sabotaging the border crossings; attempting to infiltrate into Israel; and launching kites and balloons equipped with incendiary devices and explosives at Israel.

In addition, special units were established for launching explosive and incendiary balloons, with the goal of causing damage and casualties and harassing the IDF and the civilian population of the western Negev communities at night. The systematic violence in the past year created a volatile and unstable situation that led to seven rounds of escalation, during which about 1,100 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.