For two years, White House officials have spoken of crafting a proposal to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict; the Trump administration reportedly will release the details shortly after the April 9 Israeli election. Tom Gross notes several reasons why this plan might succeed where so many others have failed:

[T]he Arab states have changed. Utterly tired of Palestinian intransigence and refusal even to negotiate publicly for a decade now—and far more concerned about the increasing Iranian threat across the region—they are favorably disposed to Israel as never before. They also know that their economies can benefit greatly from Israeli expertise. . . .

In the past, when Palestinian leaders turned down offers of independent statehood without even agreeing to further discussions (offers of a kind that Chechens, Kurds, Baluchis, Tibetans, and dozens of other stateless people would have jumped at), far from being pressured or ostracized, the Palestinian leadership was given even more money and more red-carpet treatment by Western countries. Casting themselves as perpetual victims paid off. No longer. Trump has already shown, through his decision to move the American embassy to western Jerusalem, recognize Israeli sovereignty on the Golan Heights, and cut funding to the Palestinians, that there will be a price to pay for such intransigence. . . .

Palestinians will learn that there will be massive financial investment if they accept. Incentives were offered in the past too, but the Palestinian public was never properly informed. Today, because of very high Internet usage, it will be hard for Palestinian leaders to hide from their people what is at stake.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.